Document Type

Article

Publication Date

5-2016

Department

Philosophy

Language

English

Publication Title

Philosophical Papers

Abstract

This paper proposes that the relation between property instances and token causal powers is akin to the relation between primary substances and property instances on the Aristotelian account of property instantiation. This view permits an individual to have two tokens of the same type of causal power. Paul Audi has argued that this cannot be: two tokens of the same power type are discernible, he claims, only if they are borne by discernible individuals (Audi 2012, 666). In the context of this criticism, he proposes that power tokens are individuated in part by the individuals bearing them. This paper responds to Audi’s criticism and argues against his preferred view. This paper thus establishes a theory of token causal powers where previously the literature contained only a presumed view and Audi’s objections.

Comments

Published as:
Engelhardt, Jeff. "Token Causal Powers." Philosophical Papers 45, no. 1-2 (2016): 159-180. doi: 10.1080/05568641.2016.1187481

This author post-print is made available on Dickinson Scholar with the permission of the publisher. For more information on the published version, visit Taylor and Francis's Website.

DOI

10.1080/05568641.2016.1187481

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