Spring 5-17-2020

A Colombian Peace: Impartial Ceasefires and Protected Reintegration Processes

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A Colombian Peace: Impartial Ceasefires and Protected Reintegration Processes

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the Honors Requirements for the Latin American, Latinx, and Caribbean Studies Department
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May 2020
Abstract:

For over 70 years the Colombian government has struggled with legitimizing its rule over the entirety of its dominions. Whether enveloped in a civil war (1948-1958) or battling transnational organizations like insurgency groups or drug-trafficking organizations, the South American nation has been riddled with instability. As such, Colombia has spent the last 50 years battling and negotiating peace with various insurgencies such as the FARC, ELN, M-19, and EPL, among others. Having attempted numerous peace agreements for 36 years, the Colombian government has either succeeded in or failed to achieve peace with guerilla organizations.

This monograph will use three consequential Colombian insurgent peace agreements from 1984, 1990 and 2001 to uncover an effective peace agreement strategy within Colombia. The failed 1984 and 2001 FARC agreements along with the successful 1990 M-19 accord have taught lessons for other peace process within the country, most notably, the recent 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement. Furthermore, these three official peace agreements allow me to argue that a combination of an impartially supervised ceasefire, voluntary disarmament and protected reintegration process produces the most effective strategy in Colombia for enabling a successful insurgent peace agreement. As such, the success of these agreements is vital to preserving peace in a country that has already experienced the loss of hundreds of thousands of individuals and the displacement of millions more.
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Colombian Peace: Impartial Ceasefires and Protected Reintegration Processes

Since 1964 the Colombian government has been engaged in a low-intensity asymmetric war against left-wing insurgent organizations, paramilitary groups, and drug cartels. Known as the Colombian Conflict, this civil engagement has claimed over 220,000 Colombian lives, internally displaced over 5 million individuals, and assumed the title of the Western hemisphere's longest war.¹ Composed of urban, rural, and jungle armed-engagements, this multifaceted conflict has left no region of Colombia undisturbed by war, affecting nearly one in every six Colombians.² Throughout the duration of this conflict the Colombian government has attempted to negotiate with and apply signature to seven respective peace agreements with insurgent actors such as Colombia’s largest insurgency group, the FARC-EP (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), in 1984, 2001, and 2016, the M-19 (19th of April Movement) in 1990, the EPL (Popular Liberation Army) in 1991, the ELN (National Liberation Army) in 2000, and the AUC (United Self-Defender of Colombia) paramilitary in 2003.³

I place attention on three specific peace agreements, the Acuerdo de La Uribe of 1984, the Acuerdo Político in 1990 and the Acuerdo de San Francisco in 2001. With strong similarities including among other things ceasefires, reintegration processes and disarmament, these agreements stand out in their respective decades due to the role they

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played towards fostering peace. Thus, I utilize these three peace accords to help me uncover what could be the most effective insurgent peace agreement strategy within the Colombian Conflict. I hypothesize by analyzing these three agreements that a combination of an impartially supervised ceasefire, voluntary disarmament and guaranteed reintegration protections is the most effective strategy in Colombia for enabling a successful insurgent peace agreement. The definition of a successful insurgent peace agreement varies; however, empirical studies on these insurgent peace agreements generally suggest that “success” occurs when there is an accomplished social reintegration process of ex-combatants that have been both societally accepted and historically upheld. Furthermore, a successful insurgent peace agreement occurs when the accords have provided tangible and effective transitional justice mechanisms that have appropriately reintegrated their ex-combatants politically and economically.

The Colombian government’s first attempt to end the Colombian Conflict was in 1984 after the signature of the Acuerdo de La Uribe with the FARC-EP. In a small municipality and town within the Meta department of Colombia, called La Uribe, the Colombian government under Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) established a ceasefire and commitments by the government to develop social reform throughout the country. Under the agreement’s stipulations the FARC-EP and the government prohibited violent engagement

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between the two militaries. Furthermore, the document required the Colombian government to promote agrarian reform, and improve education, housing, health and employment benefits. The agreement lasted for a little less than three years between 1984-1987 on account of flawed supervision over the ceasefire and the failure of the Colombian government’s obligation towards social reform. By 1987, the FARC-EP had remobilized, committed to a new guerilla warfare strategy, and frequently engaged in violent battles with the Colombian military, thus, marking the demise of the agreement and sending Colombia into another dark chapter of their already bloody war.

In new attempts for peace, Presidents Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986-1990) and César Augusto Gaviria Trujillo (1990-1994) signed and upheld respectively the 1990 Acuerdo Político with the M-19. Over the duration of two administrations, the Colombian government was negotiating with the M-19 over amnesty and demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR). As part of the agreement, the M-19 demanded the government provide socio-economic, political, and judicial reforms of which would come in place within a newly drafted constitution (Constitución Política de Colombia de 1991). The compromises and concessions between the two warring factions had been unprecedented considering it included guaranteed political participation of the M-19 within the Colombian

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10 Ibid, 3-4.
legislature and a new constitution.\textsuperscript{14} Officially demobilizing in 1990, the M-19 under the agreement transitioned from an armed group into a political party as the Democratic Alliance/M-19 (AD M-19).\textsuperscript{15} The Acuerdo Político of 1990 would become Colombia’s first successful insurgent peace agreement.\textsuperscript{16}

Confident from the success of the Acuerdo Político but wary of the significant rise of violence in the country, the Colombian government negotiated for peace in 2001 with the FARC-EP. On October 5, 2001, the Acuerdo de San Francisco was signed between the Andrés Pastrana Arango administration and the FARC-EP in a rural area of the San Vicente del Caguán municipality.\textsuperscript{17} In it, the agreement laid out the guidelines for the future renegotiation of terms between the two factions, however, explicitly arranged for a ceasefire, social justice reforms, and a time extension of the demilitarized zone used by the FARC-EP called El Caguán DMZ.\textsuperscript{18} Uniquely, the agreement did not specify a DDR or ceasefire supervision process as the de facto agreement was operating. The Acuerdo de San Francisco was the last agreement signed between the FARC-EP and the government during the FARC-EP 1999-2002 peace process.\textsuperscript{19} After FARC-EP military training facilities were found inside the DMZ and force-on-force incidents amassed, the Colombian government suspended the peace process and agreement in 2002.\textsuperscript{20} The failure of the agreement exacerbated violence

\begin{footnotes}
\item[14]“Acuerdo Político entre el Gobierno Nacional, los Partidos Políticos, el M 19, y la Iglesia Católica en Calidad de Tutora Moral y Espiritual del Proceso,” 4-5.
\item[15]Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas, “The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict,” 408-09.
\item[18]“Acuerdo de San Francisco de La Sombra para Concretar y Consolidar el Proceso de Paz,” 2-3.
\item[19]“Colombia Project: Dialogue with the FARC,” \textit{Center for International Policy}, June 13, 2010.
\item[20]“Colombia Project: Dialogue with the FARC.”
\end{footnotes}
between the government and the FARC-EP, almost pushing the country into a failed-state classification.21

After various attempts at negotiations with various guerilla organizations like the FARC-EP and the M-19, only one insurgent agreement succeeded. Within the context of the Colombian Conflict these three agreements had been incredibly important for establishing stability in Colombia and the region. These milestones for the Colombian government helped legitimize their leadership capabilities when dealing with malicious organizations and helped suppress more bloodshed.22 Yet, between the three agreements, the two FARC-EP agreements failed within three years while the M-19 succeeded.23 What strategies made the M-19 peace agreement more effective and eventually successful? Or rather, what strategies harmed the FARC-EP peace process and eventually doomed their respective agreements? In a broader picture, what is the most effective peace agreement strategy within the Colombian Conflict that can provide the agreement with a favorable outcome.

Distinguishing an effective strategy and the conditions that contribute to the outcomes of Colombian peace agreements is important for identifying the flaws inherent to failed agreements. The importance of understanding and explaining those conditions are predicated on the necessity of those agreements to succeed in order to prevent prolonged bloodshed and cultivate peace. Whether it be the Acuerdo de La Uribe, the Acuerdo Político, or the Acuerdo de San Francisco, when these agreements were signed there had been significant drops in violent conflict engagements between the aforementioned guerilla organizations and the

21 Juan Carlos, Pinzón. “Colombia Back from the Brink,” no. 4 (n.d.): 3; Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas, “The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict,” 420-421.
Colombian government. An example of this is with the M-19 in 1992, where after the Acuerdo Político was implemented the country experienced a drop in intensity of the conflict, otherwise known as the “stagnation period” (1992-1995). Identifying what the conditions were will help uncover overarching relationships, contextualize the peace negotiations amid the guerilla conflict, and critique the flaws adherent in failed agreements. Moreover, the importance of identifying these conditions and strategies affords me the ability to assert in academic discussion regarding Latin American peace-building processes, the potential Colombian DDR strategies may have within other Latin American nations.

This monograph will be broken down into four sections: Literature Review, Historical Context, Methodology, Analysis, and Conclusion and Reflections. The “context” section will provide the background information regarding the origins of the Colombian Conflict (La Violencia), and the FARC-EP and M-19. The “methodology” section will discuss my qualitative research, close-content analysis, and comparative study methods approach. Moreover, this section will identify the theory approach (Dean G. Pruitt’s “readiness” theory on civil conflict) used to interpret the evidence for this project. The “analysis” section will address and argue the conditions and strategies (independent variables) most effective for producing a successful Colombian insurgent peace agreement. Finally, the “conclusion and reflection” section will provide final thoughts and offer critique along with advocacy of particular strengths future agreements in Colombia can incorporate.

24 Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas, “The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict,” 420-422.
[I] Literature Review:

“Ripeness” or “Readiness” Theory, and the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: the FARC and M-19

This literature review will be broken down into two parts that address key points of discussion within current scholarship on the Colombian Conflict and the FARC and M-19 peace processes: (I) “Ripeness” or “Readiness” Theory: Insights from Colombia, and (II) Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: the FARC and M-19. In reviewing the literature these are two key bodies of scholarship on the Colombian Conflict that best contribute to the dialogue regain insurgent peace negotiation motivations and processes. In the first subsection I will review the literature regarding “ripeness” and “readiness” theory and its appliance towards the justification for peace negotiations between the Colombian government, the FARC and M-19. In “Part II” I will review and analyze the positive consensus of “disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration” processes that Colombian Conflict scholars have regarding sustained peace. Together these two bodies of scholarly work on the Colombian Conflict offer great perspective in helping uncover the reasoning behind peace negotiation processes of the M-19 and FARC.

The bibliography used in this literature review is derived from published materials no earlier than 1989 with the most recent work having been produced in 2019. Articles, books, and films argue and analyze in their respective ways the origin of political instability in Colombia, and the subsequent emergence of the FARC and M-19 within the country, and their viability and influence. Moreover, secondary sources allude to probable conditions that
have contributed to the failure of both the 1984 and 2001 FARC peace agreements but the success of the 1990 M-19 agreement.

**Part I: “Ripeness” or “Readiness” Theory: Insights from Colombia**

In order to understand how and why the FARC and M-19 had engaged in peace negotiations with the Colombian government in 1984, 1990 and 2001 academic scholarship on the Colombian Conflict has argued that “ripeness” or “readiness” theory play a significant part.26

In 1989 William Zartman coined the term “Ripeness” theory as a result of his research on Cold War civil conflicts. In his assessment, Zartman argues that within particular civil conflicts, a “ripe” moment arises when “both sides identify they are in a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS).”27 A “mutually hurting stalemate” is when conflicting parties in contention recognize there are no longer any benefits to fighting, rather, to fight drains resources and manpower.28 Zartman analogizes stalemate as the “plateau phenomenon”

where both parties reach equal and level circumstances and by arriving at the precipice both sides face the reality of total annihilation, therefore motivating them to negotiate terms.\textsuperscript{29}

Zartman’s “ripeness” theory was challenged in 1997 by Dean G. Pruitt’s “readiness” theory on civil conflict. Pruitt argues that instead of emphasizing the phenomenon of a “MHS,” civil conflict negotiations derive from “motivation and optimism.”\textsuperscript{30} Pruitt asserts that during civil conflict, the two warring factions can concurrently recognize that the conflict is unwinnable and that continued fighting generates unacceptable losses.\textsuperscript{31} However, Pruitt addresses this phenomena as part of the “motivation” that drives sides to negotiate.\textsuperscript{32} Pruitt deviates from “ripeness” theory by asserting optimism’s role in forcing negotiations. Pruitt states that the “possibility for favorable agreements for both sides” often convince warring factions to entertain the idea of ceasefires and eventual agreements.\textsuperscript{33} In addition, under “optimism” both sides lower their aspirations as organizations, attempt to build working trust, and focus on compromises that satisfy their respective goals.\textsuperscript{34} Combined, “motivation and optimism” apply the appropriate conditions for warring factions to cease engagements and instead focus on strategic arbitration.

“Readiness” theory was first applied to the Colombian Conflict in 2004 by Vera Grabe, Grace Livingston and Jenny Pearce. Vera Grabe, the former guerilla and co-founder of Colombian insurgent group AD M-19, utilized her own experience regarding peace negotiations in Colombia. Grabe asserts that the M-19 negotiated under the understanding that the conflict would not be won, and that the opportunity extended to the M-19 at first

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{29} Zartman, ”The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments,” 10.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, 238-240.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, 245.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid, 250.
\end{footnotesize}
from Colombian President Barco and then upheld by proceeding President Gaviria was a perfect compromise to cease engagements. Although not specifically stated, Grabe’s explanation of the M-19’s demobilization process runs parallel with “readiness” theory explanation regarding “motivation and optimism.” Furthermore, Grabe asserts that the M-19 was not engaged in a “MHS” because in 1990 M-19 had been at peak power and control over its dominions.

Concurrently, Grace Livingstone and Jenny Pearce assess the 1984 and 2001 FARC peace agreements under the clout of “readiness” theory. Livingston and Pearce describe the timeline of both agreements under the premise of motivation and optimism (readiness theory). According to them, the FARC had the upper hand in both negotiations due to their military prowess and the Colombian government’s political disorganization. Due to this the FARC could negotiate for favorable terms they otherwise could not have done if the roles had been reversed. Livingstone and Pearce give an example of this by alluding to the FARC’s optimism regarding a exploitive compromise they made with the Andrés Pastrana Administration (1998-2002) in 2001. The FARC’s was able to force one-sided peace conditions, thus, delivering Pastrana a military and political dilemma. Under the 2001 Acuerdo de San Francisco the guerilla organization successfully re-negotiated and extended the timeframe for the controversial El Caguán Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). El Caguán DMZ was a nearly 42,000km swath of land dedicated exclusively to FARC and insurgent members in Colombia.

37 Livingstone and Pearce, Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War, 62-64, and 66.
38 Ibid, 66-67
39 Ibid; Pearce, “Colombia” in Comparing Peace Processes, 120.
40 Gomez-Suarez and Newman, ”Safeguarding Political Guarantees in the Colombian Peace Process: Have Santos and Farc Learnt the Lessons from the Past?” 826.
Respectively opposing Grabe, Livingstone and Pearce’s analysis, Jennifer S. Holmes in 2008 and Andrei Gómez-Suárez and John Newman in 2013 argue that “ripeness” theory was the basis for the FARC peace negotiations. Holmes, and Gómez-Suárez and Newman assert that the Colombian government and the FARC negotiated with one another understanding that they had been in a “mutually hurting stalemate.” They state that the Colombian government along with the FARC had been weak and unwilling to continue hostile engagements, thus, in order to legitimize their political systems, they sought to negotiate. Holmes asserts that a “MHS” does not have to affect either side more severely than the other, rather, sides can negotiate from a position of power so long that they want peace. Therefore, in that agreement, the FARC negotiated with the Colombian government because of their acknowledgement of no future benefit for fighting. Gómez-Suárez and Newman redressed this point in their 2013 article by including the FARC 1984 peace agreement and the AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) peace agreement from 2005. Together they advocate for Holmes’ explanation regarding the FARC and the extended Colombian Conflict by stating that by 2001 the carnage of the conflict had been so severe that neither the FARC nor the Colombian government could experience any more losses, thus resulting in peace negotiations.

In more recent years, debate regarding “readiness” and “ripeness” theory regarding the FARC and the Colombian Conflict continues with little development. Onur Bakiner and Pedro Valenzuela have been the most contemporary authors offering their

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41 Ibid, 819; Holmes, de Pin Amin Gutiérrez, and Kevin M. Curtin. Guns, Drugs, and Development in Colombia, 114.
43 Holmes, de Pin Amin Gutiérrez, and Curtin. Guns, Drugs, and Development in Colombia, 59-60, 141.
perspective of these theories and their applications to the conflict. Valenzuela in 2018 utilizes the “readiness” theory approach for his explanation regarding the 2016 Colombian Peace Process between the FARC and the Colombian Government.\(^{45}\) Whereas, Bakiner in 2019 asserts “ripeness” theory for his argument on why the 2016 Colombian Peace Process is successful, but the 2015 Turkish-Kurdish Peace Process was not.\(^{46}\) While there is disagreement regarding the most applicable theory for the emergence of Colombian insurgent peace agreements, “Readiness” theory as described by Grabe, Livingstone and Pearce, among others, discusses more adequately the motivations of both negotiating factions during the 1984, 1990 and 2001 peace agreements. It takes into account the agreement’s environment, the actor’s optimism, and motivations; a multifaceted approach. It should be noted that within academia of the Colombian Conflict, “Ripeness” theory is not applied to the 1990 M-19 peace agreement, whereas, “Readiness” theory is. This is a limitation of “Ripeness” theory when discussing the Colombian Conflict.

Part II: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: FARC and M-19:

In 1989 disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDRs) programs were formally created by the United Nations to help some of the world’s most conflicted regions.\(^{47}\) Initially starting in Central America under the name of the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), this program helped facilitate DDRs within El Salvador, Guatemala and


extended Latin America. The UN’s DDRs template in the region has left much controversy throughout Latin America, however, scholarship regarding Colombia’s independent use of these demobilization and reintegration (DR’s) processes for the FARC and M-19 are in general agreement regarding their effectiveness and importance.

In 2000 Nat Colletta and Markus Kostner were the first to significantly address and analyze the demobilization and reintegration processes of the M-19’s Acuerdo Político of 1990. In their assessment they identified that demobilization and reintegration act as integral parts of the peace building process, most especially in Colombia. The DR’s under the Acuerdo Político operated as a critical task of the transition phase that helped legitimize and strengthen the judicial system of Colombia. Kostner places emphasis on the role the judicial system places within a country recovering from civil strife in that the judiciary provides reconciliation, closure and accountability. The M-19 under a DR process was able to reintegrate and acclimate in Colombian society and political systems that placed value on their demobilization, therefore, resulting in their successful transition. Grabe as a cofounder of the organization attests to this by saying the “majority of AD M-19 activists are still alive and actively support peace and democracy-building.” Colletta and Kostner, however, did not address the disarmament portion of the overall DDR process. The disarmament portion is consistent with the ceasefire process and its supervision, of which was successful under the Acuerdo Político of 1990. The conclusions derived from Colletta and Kostner's analysis on

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demobilization and reintegration processes helped influence the Pastrana Administration’s conditions within the 2001 Acuerdo de San Francisco with the FARC.52

By analyzing the Acuerdo de Santa Fe de Ralito between the Colombian government and the United Self-Defenders of Colombia (AUC), William Avilés reinforces the importance of Colletta and Kostner’s conclusion on DDRs. In 2006 Avilés asserted that the DDRs set in place for the AUC allowed the organization to move into society without retribution from the government or guerilla organizations.53 Similar to Colletta and Kostner, Avilés argues that judiciary trials of former paramilitary leaders enabled the state to be accountable.54 Furthermore, the DDRs created mechanisms within Colombia in 2003 that allowed the AUC to transition relatively easily and with amnesty which allowed the agreement to be successful.55 However, it should be noted that Avilés juxtaposes the importance of DDRs within the AUC peace process with the professionalization of the Colombian military in 2003 and the Colombian government’s leniency towards paramilitary groups versus guerilla organizations.56 He also asserts that there may be a correlation between corrupt individuals within the Colombian government and the paramilitary’s success with DDRs.57 Nonetheless, Avilés affirms that barring anomalies, the AUC members under DDRs had been on track to fully disarm and demobilize, and as a strategy DDRs are effective.58

In 2011 and 2013 DDRs were central in discussion regarding the Colombian Conflict as the Colombian government entertained another round of peace talks with the FARC. In

54 Avilés. “Paramilitarism and Colombia's Low-Intensity Democracy.” 388.
55 Ibid, 406.
56 Ibid, 406-408.
57 Ibid, 407-408.
58 Ibid.
2011 Chris Lee argued that DDRs in the context of the FARC do the opposite of what Avilés, Colletta and Kostner suggest. Lee contends that DDRs function as points of tension between the two warring factions. Lee affirms that these DDRs are so frequently violated that its importance in these agreements are overstated because the FARC has yet to actually experience a successful process. However, Lee does not mention the particular portions of the DDR that may independently affect the success of the agreement such as disarmament or the ceasefire. By 2013 during the early stages of the soon-to-be 2016 Colombia Peace Agreement, Gómez-Suárez and Newman stated that during the 1984 and 2001 FARC agreements, the Colombian government’s disrespect of the DDRs resulted in over 200 FARC member’s murders, thus promoting their recidivism. They offered their observations regarding the importance of these processes as an imperative condition to maintain during the 2013-2016 FARC peace process. This point in specific highlights a close correlation between the DDRs and the failure of the agreement itself, however, the authors did not explicitly state this assertion or offer more detail.

In its most contemporary form DDRs are still identified as beneficial strategies within Colombia for successful insurgent peace agreements. Within the 2013 article of Gómez-Suárez and Newman, they developed into the demobilization and reintegration portion of DDRs, hybrid Special Protection Forces (SPFs). Hybrid SPFs are a conglomeration of Colombian police and demobilized guerilla forces that would work together to protect current

60 Ibid, 25.
63 Ibid, 829.
demobilizing guerilla members.\textsuperscript{64} Hybrid SPF\textsc{fs} are relatively new concepts within the Colombian context and are still under development, moreover, they had been considered in the 2016 Colombian peace process, albeit controversially.\textsuperscript{65} Colletta and Kostner, Grabe and Gómez-Suárez offer great commentary regarding the effectiveness of DDR\textsc{s}. The multifaceted approach that DDR\textsc{s} offer for post-conflict state building and social justice is important for reconstruction, accountability and reconciliation. The 1984, 1990, and 2001 peace agreement included either aspects or entire formats of DDR\textsc{s} resulting in varied successful results.

While the effectiveness of DDR\textsc{s} is generally agreed upon within scholarship of the Colombian Conflict, disarmament and ceasefires lack discussion. Scholarship of DDR\textsc{s} in the Colombian Conflict focuses on demobilization and reintegration aspects and have not gone into depth on disarmament supervision or ceasefire processes. What their role may be within Colombian peace agreements has been alluded to in Gómez-Suárez and Newman’s work where they discuss the “triangle of lessons” learned from former peace negotiations, and with Grabe’s personal description of her M-19 disarmament and ceasefire process.\textsuperscript{66} However, while Gómez-Suárez and Newman address ceasefires and disarmament in this “triangle of lessons,” they do not develop scholarship regarding the influence these processes have. Grabe’s personal accounts offer the closest correlation between successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and successful agreements. Her primary accounts and descriptions operate as a good foundation for understanding the reality of DDR\textsc{s} within Colombian context.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid, 829-831.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid, 831.
This literature review used scholarship on the Colombian Conflict to uncover the reasoning behind the M-19 and the FARC-EP’s approach to peace negotiations with the Colombian government. Moreover, it sought to find a correlation between different types of ceasefire processes within DDRs, and the manner in which they influenced the success or failure of three Colombian insurgent peace agreements; unfortunately, it could not. The discourse within current scholarship regarding theory (“readiness” and “ripeness”) and the significant concurrence regarding DDR’s influence on agreements has allowed this investigation to assert that ceasefire and disarmament processes in company with general DDR formats contribute to the viability of Colombian peace agreements, most especially for the 1984, 1990, and 2001 peace accords.

**[II] Historical Context:**

This section will be broken down into three subsections, (I) The Historical Origins of the Colombia Conflict (*La Violencia*), (II) the Colombian Conflict (1964-1990), and (III) the Colombian Conflict (1990-Present). Collectively these three subsections will offer the overall context for understanding the Colombian Conflict, its actors, and the signed insurgent peace agreements. Furthermore, the bottom of this section includes Table IV which consolidates all the peace agreements throughout the Colombian Conflict.
(I) The Historical Origins of the Colombian Conflict

Since 1849 the political establishment of Colombia has been largely dominated and governed by two core parties, the Colombian Liberal Party (1848-present) and the Colombian Conservative Party (1849-present). The Colombian Liberal Party (CLP) is inspired by a classic liberal party model focusing on a political ideology that advocates for civil liberties and economic freedoms, whereas, the Colombian Conservative Party (CCP) is inspired by the classic conservatism model, which advocates for property rights, authority, and traditions (patria in Colombia). These two Colombian parties governed intermittently and unabashedly often ignoring their common electorate. They often prioritized the needs of their respective elite hierarchies that included plantation owners, media outlet moguls, and career politicians. Between 1849 and 1940 social and economic disparities within Colombia brought on by the oligarchic CLP and CCP had reached a critical stage as unemployment and income inequality reached historic highs, and political representation was at an all-time low. By 1940 those social stresses and political frustrations, along with the emergence of a populist socialist wave across Latin America, fostered an environment that demanded change from the Colombian system.

Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, a lawyer, union leader, and CLP leader led a socialist movement (1920-1948) that divided CLP and stripped the CCP of some of their electorate loyalties. Often criticizing his own party (CLP) and the CCP, accusing them of maintaining the Colombian oligarchic status quo, Gaitán tapped into the frustration and anger of millions of

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67 Jorge Gaitan: The End of A Colombian Dream, directed by Ideas Film. 2010.
68 Jorge Gaitan: The End of A Colombian Dream.
69 Ibid.
Colombians against their established political system. By proclaiming the need for social and economic reforms, universal suffrage, land reform, income equality, and a diverse representative body, among other things, Gaitán had catapulted his brand and name into the higher echelons of political and social discussion. Gaitán divided the CLP creating his own camp, the “Gaitanistas” and stripped the CCP of their higher educated youth and middle-class workers electorate base. Amassing an electoral base from rural, working, and higher educated Colombian classes, by 1945 a third of Colombia’s 10 million population had aligned themselves with the “Gaitanista” movement proclaiming him to be “the people's candidate.” By 1947 the CLP had no other choice but to reluctantly make Gaitán the leader of the party, subsequently preparing him for the upcoming 1950 presidential election cycle as the CLP’s singular candidate. This would be Gaitán’s second attempt at the office of president of Colombia.

On April 9th, 1948 Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was assassinated amid his second attempted presidential campaign, setting off a chain of events directly considered to be the historical origins of the Colombian Conflict. At 1:30 pm at the doorsteps of his office in downtown Bogotá (capital of Colombia), Gaitán’s was shot and killed by Juan Roa Sierra, a conservative extremist with CCP sympathies. Rattled by the death of their leader Gaitán, nearby supporters amassed into a mob that subsequently killed Juan Roa Sierra before he was able to be questioned by police investigators. It is still unclear whether Juan Roa Sierra acted alone, or what truly inspired him to commit his actions; however, many academics argue he was hired to kill Gaitán by either the CLP elites, CCP, the Colombian Communist party, the

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73 Jorge Gaitan: The End of A Colombian Dream
74 Ibid.
USSR, or the CIA.\textsuperscript{75} Regardless, Gaitán was widely speculated to have become the president of Colombia had he not been killed.\textsuperscript{76} His legacy on social justice and inclusion, socialist reform, and expanded political representation inspired for years to come the need for Colombians from different backgrounds to fight for social and political injustice. His death sparked \textit{El Bogotazo} a 10-hour subversive riot in 1948 that leveled downtown Bogotá and killed 600-3,000 people.\textsuperscript{77} Immediately after, in attempts to control social unrest, the CPL joined with incumbent conservative president of Colombia Ospina Pérez to help contain chaos and establish order. President Ospina Pérez would soon blame the CPL in orchestrating these uprising and instituted full social and political persecutions of liberal identifying individuals across the country. Six months after Gaitán’s death, his power vacuum was never filled and a 10-year civil war called \textit{La Violencia} (1948-1958) began between liberals, conservatives, and “Gaitanistas,” claiming at least 200,000 Colombian lives.\textsuperscript{78}

During \textit{La Violencia} the governing conservative party violently repressed CLP and former Gaitán supporters setting up the environment for an insurgency organization to form. The CCP, “Gaitanistas,” and CLP forces fought throughout Colombia’s urban, rural, and jungle regions. Any left-leaning political candidate with Gaitán-inspiration, or lack thereof, was either jailed, forced out of the country, or assassinated.\textsuperscript{79} The CCP government cracked down on liberal and or socialist identifying individuals of all classes; however, most of the victims of the civil war derived from the rural regions of the country.\textsuperscript{80} Liberal and or socialist peasant farmers, and laborers, most consistent with the demographic of Gaitán


\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{77} Pearce, “Colombia” in \textit{Comparing Peace Processes}, 116-17.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid; \textit{Jorge Gaitan: The End of A Colombian Dream}.

\textsuperscript{80} Holmes, de Pin Amin Gutiérrez, and Curtin. “Historical and Geographical Propensities to Violence,” 22.
supporters, were directly targeted by Colombian military forces. While a portion of these individuals had violently defended against Colombian insurrection, the majority of La Violencia’s victims were innocent campesinos, three quarters of the 200,000 casualty marker. This 10-year period of explicit political and social oppression, intimidation, and violence created lasting historical grievances committed against campesinos and socialists in Colombia paving the way for incentives and inspiration for insurgent organizations. Charles Tilly’s Theory on State-Building approach would agree with this assertion in that the grievances and repercussions of La Violencia, along with the sustained political, economic, and social inequality, would force any group on the defensive to rise to arms. The three-way conflict’s casualties established historical precedent that victimized groups would almost never be able to forgive and secured a lasting divide between party liberals and socialists within the Colombian political system. All that to say, the conditions for an insurgent organization to form inside Colombia had been created.

The aftermath of La Violencia, set up the conditions for the Colombian Conflict to begin through the emergence of Colombian insurgency groups. La Violencia ended 1958 after CLP and CCP forces agreed to a ceasefire by subsequently signing the National Front. The National Front established a 16-year period that rotated liberal and conservative presidential leadership in order to facilitate peaceful democratic process and stability. However, this new political front politically alienated the Gaitán supporting demographic (rural, working-class, and higher educated individuals). Considering the exorbitant amount of losses incurred on these anti-government individuals during La Violencia, this new political oppression and sustained violent insurrection by the rotation of liberal and conservative

81 Ibid, 25.
governments united the Gaitán supporting demographic as an anti-government, Marxist insurgency. By 1964 under the leadership of Pedro Antonio Marín, also known as Manuel Marulada Vélez, the FARC was formed, thus beginning the Colombian Conflict.83 This Gaitán-inspired, *La Violencia*-induced Marxist insurgent movement would operate out of rural and mountainous Colombia attacking pro-government institutions, and Colombian military forces. Their insurgent brand consisting of socialist reform and revolution, wealth distribution, and social and political equality would inspire over hundreds of thousands of Colombian’s across the country to rise up to arms.84 Furthermore, The FARC’s long-term objective for regional self-autonomy earned the brand success and would go on to inspire and influence the emergence of two more left-wing extremist groups, the ELN, and the EPL. By 1967, the Colombian government had lost legitimacy and control over their sovereign domain to Marxist insurgencies, where nearly 30,000 individuals had been killed.85


Following the emergence of the FARC, the Colombian government was struggling to create a comprehensive counter-insurgent plan, thus allowing insurgent groups to thrive. The abilities for the FARC, to operate clandestinely, ambiguously, and efficiently made military campaigns against the groups relatively ineffective. Relying largely on hearsay within rural and mountainous regions of Colombia, the Colombian military lacked the proper strategic knowledge to operate effectively against the Marxist-insurgents. Between 1964-1968 the

83 Lee, "The FARC and the Colombian Left: Time for a Political Solution?" 28-30.
84 Ibid, 30-31.
Colombian government had only managed to launch one major attack on FARC forces that occurred in Marquetalia on May 27, 1964, killing 48 peasant followers of the FARC.  

Matters only worsened for the Colombian government after the 1970 Colombian General Election resulted in accusations of fraud that favored newly elected conservative President Misael Pastrana. Angered and encouraged by the defrauded election scandal, a new and particularly violent left-wing insurgent organization was born within Colombia’s urban scene: 19th of April Movement (M-19). Led by then-university students Antonio Navarro, Carlos Pizarro and Jaime Bateman, among others, the M-19 dedicated itself to exposing electoral fraud, corruption and oligarchic hierarchies in Colombia, albeit, violently. Unlike the FARC, the M-19 were a nationalist inspired movement generally fighting against imperialist and imperially-inspired entities while advocating for democratic principles; they were not communist or particularly anti-capitalist. Due to the lack of effective pressure by the Colombian government and military, by 1972, insurgent groups like the M-19, FARC, ELN, and EPL had established medical and educational services for loyal rural and urban communities, guerilla training camps, and a payroll predicated on the ransoms from kidnapped Colombian officials. The insurgent brand within Colombia was able to provide more services for the impoverished, rural, and low-income classes of Colombia than its central government had ever done before. This economic relief, and

90 Ibid.
92 Mapping Militant Organizations. “Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.”
security established a reinforcing feedback-loop that maintained the population of dedicated Marxist or nationalist guerilla fighters.

Understanding the need for a sustained cash-flow to maintain its influence and operations, insurgent organizations began to collaborate with illicit drug producing and trafficking cartels. The unabated insurgency within Colombia’s borders as a result of the unorganized nature of the Colombian military created a vast network of illicit activity throughout the country. The weak central government and policing force created an atmosphere within Colombia that hindered diversifying self-organization. Demanding security, economic relief, and governance, isolated and urban regions of Colombia organized themselves into powerfully violent systems: the FARC, M-19, ELN, EPL, Cali Cartel, and the Medellín Cartel, among others.93 By the late 1970’s insurgent groups and drug cartels created interconnections and flows within their subsystems that increased their stock of influence, capital, or power over the Colombian government. The overall Colombian system was being pushed to the edge of chaos as the government lost complete control of nearly half its departments (an administrative and political subdivision of Colombia [32 in total]).94 According to Holmes, she states that between the cartels and insurgency groups, the insurgent organizations would protect the cartel’s illicit drug farmers within their territories as long as cartels paid their due tax to the insurgencies. Moreover, she states “contributing factors to this mutualistic relationship is the continued lack of opportunity in rural areas which potentially drive increased illegal activity.”95 The Cali Cartel frequently worked and paid taxes to the ELN and FARC, and the Medellín Cartel frequently worked with the EPL

94 Ibid, 68.
and FARC by paying their respective tax.\textsuperscript{96} By the 1980’s the Colombian government was being undermined as their flow of income was tightened while violence spread, and corruption exploded.

In the mid-1980’s, organized crime and insurgency violence had reached an all-time high prompting the Colombian government to seek out peace agreements. During the Seventh Guerilla Conference in 1982, the FARC officially changed its name to the FARC-EP (People’s Army) in order to consolidate its political message of unity for all Colombians, alter long-term objectives away from self-autonomy focusing instead on attaining political power, and expand its engagements from rural fighting to amalgamate an urban battlefield.\textsuperscript{97} Furthermore, this shift allowed the FARC-EP to fall within the compliance of the first and second protocols of the Geneva Convention, which would legally allow the insurgency group humanitarian protections by supportive international entities during the armed conflict.\textsuperscript{98}

Between 1980-1989 violence within Colombia was so severe that nearly 50,000 people had been killed, most of them innocent bystanders.\textsuperscript{99} The national homicide rate within Colombia from 1985-1989 rose from 41 homicides per 100,000 people to 68 homicides per 100,000 people, making it one of the most dangerous places in the world.\textsuperscript{100}

Under the direction of President Betancur (1982-1986) the Colombian government reached out to various insurgency groups including the FARC-EP, ELN and M-19 to put an

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid, 105.
\textsuperscript{100} “Medellín Homicide Rate, 1975-2015.”
end to this bloody engagement. The motivations and optimistic expectations as detailed by “readiness” theory help us understand why the Colombian government and the FARC-EP began negotiations in the first place. The FARC-EP likely interpreted this olive branch as a motivating factor that would allow the organization to bring their revolutionary fight to political arena, thus, accomplishing one their objectives. Whereas, the Colombian government felt by demobilizing the insurgency, it would help legitimize the country’s democracy and allow the government to focus on their counternarcotic strategy. As such these motivating factors as outline by “readiness” theory initiated a peace process beginning in 1983 and finishing in 1984 with a formal agreement called the Acuerdo de La Uribe.\(^{101}\)

The agreement helped transition the FARC-EP and smaller insurgencies from a militant organization into a political party called the Union Patriótica (UP).\(^{102}\) UP would receive initial success within the Colombia legislature, however, biased government supervision to protect the demobilizing members resulted in a majority of UP member’s assassinations and a breakdown of “working-trust.”\(^{103}\)

The agreement disintegrated as peace talks collapsed with other insurgency groups, UP members remained attacked and the M-19’s sieging of the Palace of Justice (Colombia’s Supreme Court). On November 6, 1985, the M-19 took hostage over 300 people, including 11 supreme court magistrates in order to place pressure on the Betancur administration for violating the 1984 peace agreement.\(^{104}\) The Colombian government responded with brute military force on the court resulting in a botched hostage crisis that killed more than 100

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\(^{101}\) Mapping Militant Organizations. “Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.”


\(^{103}\) Ibid, 824-825.

people, including 11 of Colombia's 21 supreme court justices. Accusations have since been place on infamous cartel leader Pablo Escobar (1949-93) for having paid over $2 million in aid of the operation for the group to destroy his criminal filings along with their own. Matters deteriorated further when Pablo Escobar (1949-93) downed an Avianca airline flight in attempts to assassinate future Colombian President César Gaviria Trujillo; 107 lives were lost. With the collapse and failure of its first ever peace agreement in 1987, violence surged impressively and Colombia fell deeper into its civil conflict. By the beginning of 1989 the Colombian Conflict hit a pivot point that began a surge of violence that would not plateau until mid-1990.

The Colombian Conflict had reached a critical stage by 1990 that the international community was ready to classify it as a failed state. The conflict peaked in the early 1990’s where between 1990 and 1994 through kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings, the conflict killed an added 70,000 individuals. From 1989-1991 Medellín, Colombia (the country’s second most populous city) homicide rate for example had increased to 400 homicides per 100,000 people, while the national average rose to 78. This is indicative of a larger trend within Colombia in that era that displays the intensity of the conflict that had incorporated an especially embattled urban scene. Furthermore, the Colombian judicial system was still weakened from the palace siege, thus allowing insurgency and cartel organizations to establish overwhelming influence.

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106 Colombia Reports. “1985 Palace of Justice Siege.”
110 "Medellín Homicide Rate, 1975-2015,“
(IV) The Colombian Conflict (1990-Present)

By 1990, however, President Barco decided to attempt a peace agreement with an insurgency group once more. The M-19 and the Colombian government over the span of a year (1989-1990) began to cultivate a “working-trust” that allowed each other to create motivating objectives that underscored “readiness” theory concepts. Between the government and insurgency group, optimistic expectations grew amid negotiations and both sides accrued advantages that reinforced their respective leveraging power. As a result, on March 9th, 1990, the Acuerdo Político Entre el Gobierno Nacional y el M-19 was signed and ratified under the influence of “readiness” concepts (motivation, optimism, and working-trust).

Becoming Colombia’s first successful insurgent peace agreement came with many stipulations including full demobilization, political party transition, and securities from paramilitary violence.111 Its success established a well needed precedent that began to shift the tides of the conflict. The agreement demanded a new constitution for Colombia that would offer DDRs for other insurgent organizations like the EPL.112 Under the César Gaviria Trujillo administration Colombia officially ratified the new constitution in 1991, fulfilling the promise to the M-19 peace agreements and extending peace negations to the EPL.113

With the help of international aid and U.S. military involvement and training, the Colombian government was beginning to show signs that it could establish governing power it had not experienced for nearly 30 years. By 1991, newly elected President César Gaviria Trujillo would successfully sign and complete his own peace agreement with the EPL called

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the Final Agreement of Liberation. Moreover, he would champion the drafting of a new Colombian constitution in 1991 as promised to the M-19 that would open the door for future insurgent peace agreements to be signed. While the signature and presence of these agreements did not have an immediate effect on deterring violence in the early 1990’s, it demonstrated a shift in favor of the Colombian government. Under the Samper administration (1994-98) however, violence began to rise as the country fell once more into political turmoil.\textsuperscript{114} Samper had been accused of receiving significant funds from the Cali Cartel for him to win and otherwise close election with future President Andrés Pastrana.\textsuperscript{115} This scandal (Proceso 8.000) undermined both his presidency and Colombia’s counter-insurgency progress which resulted in the withdrawal of financial assistance from the U.S. and the resurgence of an especially strong FARC-EP and paramilitary organizations.\textsuperscript{116}

The Colombian Conflict began to resurge in the early 2000’s after the Colombian government started to adopt stronger military and negotiation strategies. The Colombian government found encouragement after succeeding with two insurgent peace agreements. Therefore, in 2000 and 2001 respectively, the Andrés Pastrana administration sought to sign and ratify peace agreements with the ELN and the FARC-EP. Once more under the influence of “readiness” concepts, these peace negotiations sought to foster optimistic expectations, advantageous motivations and a “working-trust” relationship between the Colombian government, ELN and the FARC-EP. Unfortunately, the Acuerdo Entre el Gobierno Nacional y el ELN (ELN) and the Acuerdo de San Francisco of 2001 (FARC-EP) was not able to maintain the “working-trust” and optimistic expectations necessary for and effective

\textsuperscript{114} Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas, “The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict.” 417.
\textsuperscript{116} Femando Cepeda, Ulloa. “Origen, desarrollo y desenlace del Caligate,” n.d. 338.
peace process, thus, both agreements failed as their stipulations were violated by both parties. By trend, the failure of these agreements significantly increased violence within Colombia.

In 2002, the election of Álvaro Uribe instituted a dramatic shift that significantly hindered insurgency and cartel power dynamics. With hardline militaristic policies along with the implementation of U.S. crafted Plan Colombia, a comprehensive diplomatic and militaristic initiative aimed against left-wing insurgency and drug cartels, Álvaro Uribe decimated the armed actors of the Colombian Conflict. The FARC-EP for example lost nearly three quarters of their insurgency forces, and the paramilitary organization AUC was subdued into negotiation. On July 15, 2003, the AUC signed the Acuerdo de Santa Fe de Ralito, officially demobilizing their forces and reintegrating with Colombian politics and society. By the end of his administration, Álvaro Uribe had successfully professionalized the Colombian military and reduced violence within the country substantially. Insurgent induced violence within the country had reached record lows, and cities once decimated by the conflict like Cali and Medellín had begun to rebuild substantially. It should be noted however, that while the strategies proved successful, Uribe’s administration had been accused on many of occasions of collaborating with paramilitary organizations like the AUC and committing human rights violations.

Between 2010 and 2018 the increased U.S. presence and foreign investment into the country under President Juan Manuel Santos had established Colombia as a legitimate and stable government with the region. Santos who had formerly been the Minister of National Defense under Uribe had made it an objective for his administration to finally end the conflict by reaching an agreement with the FARC-EP. However, difficulties regarding his past connection with the Uribe administration cultivated district between the insurgency and Santos’s administration. After distancing himself from Uribe and his policies, Santos and the FARC-EP began establishing a “working-trust” relationship that helped institute a three-phase peace negotiation process that required a country-wide plebiscite for the eventual agreement. This three-phase peace negotiation process took inspiration from the former peace agreements and helped institute especially motivating expectations amid negotiations that the FARC-EP and the Colombian government could trust and it. On August 24, 2016 Juan Manuel Santos’ administration announced with the FARC-EP, The Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace of 2016. However, on October 2, 2016, the Colombian public unexpectedly voted “no” to the agreement and its terms at 50.2%, thus, throwing the accord in disarray. Afterward the government and the FARC-EP signed a revised agreement without a public referendum on November 24, 2016

and officially ratified the agreement on November 29, 2016 officially ending the conflict.\textsuperscript{127} This momentous event marked, at least temporarily, the end of the Colombian Conflict, putting an over 50-year war to a close. The only relevant insurgency group remaining is the ELN, however, they too were actively engaging with the Santos administration for their own respective peace agreement.\textsuperscript{128}

Under the current conservative administration of Iván Duque Márquez (an Uribe sympathizer), the 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement is showing signs of collapse. The overall conclusion of the Colombian Conflict was 50 years in the making by the time the 2016 CPA was controversially ratified. Three years after the ratification of the agreement, a handful of its stipulations have been revised, stalled, and or completely revoked putting Colombian peace and stability at risk. The drawback on the FARC-EP agreement has made the ELN skeptical of their own negotiated peace process with the Duque government. Moreover, citing FARC-EP recidivism, the ELN has decided not to agree to a ceasefire, opting instead for sustained engagement during the negotiations. As of November 2019, mass pressures have been placed on the Duque administrations’ lax approach towards following or at least reforming the 2016 CPA with the FARC-EP. On the 21st of November, all this pressure boiled over and culminated into a national strike against the Colombian government's complacency towards the gradual return of the conflict. Where the 2016 CPA goes from here is anyone’s guess, however, the arguments of this paper can be applied as a theory approach in which to analyze this peace agreement’s current state.

\textsuperscript{127} Meernik, DeMeritt, and López. \textit{As War Ends: What Colombia Can Tell Us About the Sustainability of Peace and Transitional Justice}, 6.

Table IV: Peace Agreement, Organization Affiliation, Year, and Outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace Agreement</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Success or Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acuerdo de La Uribe</td>
<td>FARC-EP</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acuerdo Político</td>
<td>M-19</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entre el Gobierno y el M-19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acuerdo Final</td>
<td>EPL</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gobierno Nacional - Ejercito Popular</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acuerdo Entre el</td>
<td>ELN</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gobierno Nacional y el ELN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acuerdo de San Francisco</td>
<td>FARC-EP</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acuerdo de Sante Fe de Ralito</td>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Agreement to End the Armed</td>
<td>FARC-EP</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>In-Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict and Build a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Stable and Lasting Peace

Source: Isiah Godoy. (Based on insurgent peace agreements).

Note: Portions of Historical Section recycled from my SRP of INST 401-1 as permitted by Prof. Frantantuono on 12/19/19.

[III] Theoretical Approach and Research Method:

The Theoretical Approach and Research Methods section is broken down into two subsections: “theoretical framework and data collection,” and “research method.” The “theoretical framework and data collection” subsection discusses how I used “readiness” theory to help me understand my sources, along with the approaches I used to collect the data for my argument. The “research method” subsection has three parts that include my independent variables, case selection, and dependent variables. Moreover, the “research method” subsection provides Table III which displays the combination of variables I lay out throughout this section. Table III includes what I believe to be the most effective strategy for a successful Colombian insurgent peace agreement.

Theoretical Framework and Data Collection:
I use Pruitt’s “readiness” theory on civil conflict to help me understand how and why the FARC and M-19 negotiated peace with and demanded concession from the Colombian government. As referenced in the literature review, Pruitt asserts that two warring factions in a stagnant civil conflict will negotiate with one another based on “motivation” and “optimism.”¹²⁹ Under this approach, the Colombian government, the FARC-EP and M-19 negotiated their respective peace agreements from positions of “working trust” and ulterior motives (reference “literature review”).¹³⁰ This is beneficial to know because it allows me to understand why ceasefires, disarmament and reintegration processes are important within Colombian peace agreements. Furthermore, using this theory helped me explain throughout my argument why “working trust” is imperative for an effective insurgent peace agreement.

Close-content and comparative study analysis helped me identify certain conditions that are considered both important and recurring within Colombian peace agreements. By using close-content analysis I was able to clarify that ceasefires, reintegration and a demobilization processes, among other things, are present in the Acuerdo de La Uribe of 1984 (FARC-EP), Acuerdo Político of 1990 (M-19), and Acuerdo de San Francisco of 2001 (FARC-EP). Using the secondary sources provided historical background that contextualized these variables within the agreements. Through comparative study, I could affirm that these variables are a pattern because they are present in each of these documents. The agreements each had stipulations that either explicitly stated or referend to ceasefire supervision, reintegration and demobilization. Identifying this pattern further reinforced the necessity to investigate them. Together, close-content analysis and the comparative study allowed me to

¹³⁰ Ibid, 238-240.
code a set of variables that I believe is the most effective insurgent peace agreement strategy within the Colombian Conflict.

Research Method:

Independent Variable:

I assert that the effectiveness and viability of the Acuerdo de La Uribe of 1984 (FARC-EP), Acuerdo Político of 1990 (M-19), and Acuerdo de San Francisco of 2001 (FARC-EP) peace strategies were predicated on the presence of an impartial ceasefire, voluntary guerilla disarmament and a protected reintegration process. I identified that each of these agreements incorporate each of those aspects in comparable ways, however, only the Acuerdo Político of 1990 proved to be successful. Therefore, in order to analyze these three processes, I coded these independent variables based on their explicit function. I labeled these variables as A, B, C, D, E, and F. The coded information is consolidated below on Table I which labels and defines the letters. The analysis portion of the monograph will expand on this information and the presence of these variables, or lack thereof, within the three agreements.

Table I: Independent Variables

<p>| A             | Partial supervised ceasefire |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>B</strong></td>
<td>Impartial 3\textsuperscript{rd} Party supervised ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td>Government demanded weapons disposal or disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D</strong></td>
<td>Voluntary Guerilla Disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E</strong></td>
<td>Unprotected reintegration process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F</strong></td>
<td>Protected reintegration process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Case Selection:**

The Acuerdo de La Uribe of 1984 (FARC-EP), Acuerdo Político of 1990 (M-19), and Acuerdo de San Francisco of 2001 (FARC-EP) each had been negotiated and signed during high levels of guerilla-government violence (1), high levels of social inequality (2), and ongoing political instability (3). Labeled one, two and three respectively, these variables are used to classify the control variables for the case selection. Throughout the entire peace process and eventual agreement, these are the three conditions they all have consistent with one another regardless of the years that separate them.

The Acuerdo de La Uribe of 1984 (FARC-EP), Acuerdo Político of 1990 (M-19), and Acuerdo de San Francisco of 2001 (FARC-EP) experienced an increase of guerilla-government clashes during their respective years. In 1984, 1990 and 2001, the Colombian government and the guerilla organizations such as the FARC-EP and M-19 violently confronted each other around 500, 600 and 630 times respectively.\textsuperscript{131} When compared within that agreement’s decade in the Colombian Conflict, 1984, 1990 and 2001 experienced

\textsuperscript{131} Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas, “The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict,” 424.
significant spikes in guerilla-government violence, each amounting to between a 100-150% increase from the year prior.\(^{132}\) Due to this pattern between the three insurgent agreements, I identified high-levels of guerilla-government violence as the first notable control variable amid Colombian insurgent peace agreements.

The 1984, 1990 and 2001 agreements took place during years of high levels of inequality in Colombia. Levels of inequality is identified by the yearly given Gini coefficient, the number used to measure the level of social and income inequality in a region.\(^{133}\) The Gini index ranges between the lowest levels of inequality at .00 and the highest levels at 1.0. Within Colombia, during the 1983-84, 1990-91 and 2000-01 peace processes, the country’s Gini number was .48, .49 and .55 respectively.\(^{134}\) To put this in perspective, available Gini data on Latin America for those years place Colombia as the fourth (1984), fifth (1991) and third (2001) most unequal country in the region.\(^{135}\) Comparing the peace process year’s Gini numbers with Colombia’s corresponding non-peace process years (1985-86, 1992-93 and 2002-03), the 1984, 1990 and 2001 peace agreements can be identified during peaks of inequality in Colombia. The consistency of this variable throughout each of the agreement’s allowed me to confidently label it as the second control.

During the negotiation and ratifications of the agreements, the Colombian government experienced high levels of anti-government events and factionalism. According to Luisa Blanco and Robin Grier, political instability within Latin America is defined as the “number of assassinations, coups, government crises, anti-government demonstrations,

\(^{132}\) Ibid, 424.
strikes, riots, purges, guerrilla activity, and revolution.”136 In their assessment of political instability with Latin America, Colombia between 1971 and 2000 ranked as the 5th most politically unstable nation within the region.137 Blanco and Grier’s line graphs demonstrate the high levels of political instability in Colombia in 1984, 1990, and 2001.138 Furthermore, in 1984, 1990 and 2001 the Colombian government had been suffering from high levels of factionalism.139 Factionalism is when either parochial or ethnic-based political factions compete for political influence to establish particularistic agendas against bipartisan objectives or agendas.140 An example of this is during the Acuerdo de San Francisco of 2001 when the Pastrana Administration opted to extend El Caguán DMZ timeframe for the FARC-EP against the instances of the majority of the Colombian government, military and society.141 The years of the agreements, 1984, 1990 and 2001 have these conditions in common therefore I identified it as the third control variable.

Regarding the two other successful Colombian peace agreements identified on Table IV in the “historical context” section, they did not fall under the same control variables. The 1991 EPL agreements did not occur during high levels of guerrilla-government violence or political instability. The EPL agreement landed within a period of “stagnation” where clashes were common but not at an unprecedented level.142 The 2003 AUC peace agreement was between the Colombian government and the paramilitary force United Self-Defender of

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138 Ibid, 82.
139 Ibid, 82.
140 Ibid, 83.
142 Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas, “The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict,” 420-422.
Colombia. Within the Colombian Conflict, paramilitary forces are distinct right-wing, government sympathizing militant organizations dedicated to kill guerilla insurgencies and drug cartels. The 2003 agreement while successful, is not an insurgency agreement.

**Table II: Control Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High levels of guerilla-government violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>High levels of social inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ongoing political instability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dependent Variables:**

The dependent variables of the agreements are determined by the success or failure of the agreement, thereby, labeled F (failure) or S (success). Within Colombian scholarship a successful agreement is defined as an agreement that has permanently disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated a guerilla or militant organization into Colombian society. Moreover, an agreement is considered a success if the organization in contention has completely ended all forms of violence and have successfully reintegeated. The Acuerdo de La Uribe of 1984 (FARC-EP) is a failure, Acuerdo Político of 1990 (M-19) is a success, and Acuerdo de San Francisco of 2001 (FARC-EP) is a failure.

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144 Ibid, 59-64.
146 Ibid, 133.
Table III: Combination of Variables for the 1984, 1990 and 2001 Peace Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreements</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
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<td>1984</td>
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<td>1990</td>
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<td>2001</td>
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Table III displays all the aforementioned variables together to reveal the patterns between the three agreements. As stated earlier, these three agreements occurred under similar conditions therefore, they maintain the same control. It should be noted that the failed 1984 and 2001 FARC-EP peace agreements have the same independent variables, whereas, the successful M-19 agreement does not. Utilizing this information, my aim is to assert that the variables incorporated within the Acuerdo Político of 1990 as shown on Table III, are suitable for crafting an effective insurgent peace agreement strategy in Colombia.

[IV] Analysis:

The analysis section will assert that a combination of an impartial third-party supervised ceasefire, voluntary disarmament and guaranteed reintegration protections within the DDR process is the most effective strategy to promote and maintain a successful
Colombian insurgency peace agreement. These three variables are present under the Acuerdo Político of 1990 which happens to be the most notably successful agreement amid the Colombian Conflict. Moreover, the M-19 agreement shares the same conditions as the other two FARC-EP agreements, yet the FARC-EP agreements failed.

By examining the Acuerdo de La Uribe in 1984, the Acuerdo Político of 1990, and Acuerdo de San Francisco of 2001, the section will analyze the agreements with their independent variables (reference Table III). This section is divided into two subsections, the first subsection discusses the impartial or partial supervised ceasefires along with the voluntary or demanded disarmament process. The second subsection will address the controversial reintegration protections included or excluded in the agreements.

**Ceasefires & Disarmament:**

The Acuerdo de La Uribe in 1984, the Acuerdo Político of 1990, and Acuerdo de San Francisco of 2001 each include ceasefire agreements.¹⁴⁷ A ceasefire agreement within the Colombian context is defined as, “disallow kidnapping, extortion and terrorism in all its forms,” along with the temporary termination of force on force engagements between the guerilla organizations and the Colombian government.¹⁴⁸ This definition derives from the Acuerdo de La Uribe of 1984, and has since been used to influence the language for Colombian ceasefires especially within these aforementioned agreements. This language is

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¹⁴⁷ “Acuerdo de La Uribe,” 1-2; “Acuerdo Político entre el Gobierno Nacional, los Partidos Políticos, el M 19, y la Iglesia Católica en Calidad de Tutora Moral y Espiritual del Proceso,” 4-5; “Acuerdo de San Francisco de La Sombra para Concretar y Consolidar el Proceso de Paz,” 2-3.

¹⁴⁸ “Acuerdo de La Uribe,” 1-2
present on line four of the 1984 agreement, the first paragraph of section eight of the 1990 agreement, and paragraph five of the 2001 agreement.  

Ceasefires are often instituted during government-insurgency peace negotiations due to the significant presence of violence preceding or during many of the peace processes. Prior to the start of the negotiations of the Acuerdo de La Uribe, between January and August of 1984 there was over 600 political assassinations between the FARC-EP and the Colombian government as opposed to that previous year’s nearly 400 cases. As a result of this unprecedented rise of violence within the Betancur period, the Colombian government sought a comprehensive ceasefire under the La Uribe agreement which included nearly 90% of active guerillas in Colombia at the time. The guerillas included primarily FARC-EP members, some M-19 members and smaller insurgency groups. Much like in 1984, preceding the M-19 peace process, guerilla-government-civilian casualties by March of 1990 amassed to nearly 1,800 individuals, an increase from 1989’s total 1,500. This prompted the adoption of a ceasefire between the Colombian government and the M-19. After signing the Acuerdo Político of 1990 the Colombian Conflict entered a period of “stagnation” where causalities between the government, guerilla organizations and civilians decreased and then plateaued to around 600 or more casualties a year between 1991-96. Once more in 2001, as a result of the conflict’s re-intensification period under Samper, the FARC-EP peace

149 “Acuerdo de La Uribe,” 1-2; “Acuerdo Político entre el Gobierno Nacional, los Partidos Políticos, el M 19, y la Iglesia Católica en Calidad de Tutora Moral y Espiritual del Proceso,” 4-5; “Acuerdo de San Francisco de La Sombra para Concretar y Consolidar el Proceso de Paz,” 2-3.
process ceasefire during the Pastrana administration occurred amid the peak violence where over 4,700 individuals were killed in contrast to the 3,200 in 2000. Ceasefires are commonplace when discussing Colombian insurgent peace agreements, however, the manner in which they are implemented can provide either effective results or negative consequences.

Ceasefires in Colombia do not operate effectively or succeed under biased supervision. Within the Acuerdo de La Uribe the Colombian government put its military in charge of supervising the ceasefire. Identified as one of Betancur’s mistakes, the Colombian military was given the power to monitor and administer their interactions with the FARC-EP. The Colombian military who initially were against the ceasefire were now in charge of regulating it. During the years of the ceasefire, 1984-87, the military and the FARC-EP instead of mollifying the conflict clashed increasingly by year (130, 160 and 200 times respectively). In between 1984-87 the Colombian military had the power to audit their own records during the ceasefire. Identifying this conflict of interest, in 1990 the UN High Commission for Human Rights accused the Colombian military of committing and covering-up massacres during this period.

In accordance to “readiness” theory, this deviation from the agreement broke the “working-trust” between the FARC-EP and the Colombian government. “Working trust” is defined as the transparent communication and understanding between the two warring

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154 Ibid, 418–419.
156 Ibid, 2-3;
factions.\textsuperscript{161} The Colombian military’s power to supervise the ceasefire allowed them to violate it without consequence. An example of this is when the Colombian military would kill and then purposely false-identify often innocent demobilizing FARC-EP members as malicious combatants.\textsuperscript{162} While the FARC-EP was not guiltless pertaining to their own actions that violated the agreement, the organization understood that the peace process narrative was being distorted against them as per the Colombian government.\textsuperscript{163} Under this motivation the FARC-EP and the Colombian government failed to establish transparent bilateral communication, thus, resulting in an illegitimate and failed ceasefire process.

The partisan 1984 ceasefire crafted an environment for the FARC-EP not to rationalize a voluntary disarmament. Due to constant attack by the Colombian military during the negotiations and after the peace agreement, the FARC-EP was pigeonholed into not to giving up their arms.\textsuperscript{164} As a result, due to the of fear of retaliation by the FARC-EP, the Betancur administration demanded the FARC-EP turn in their weapons throughout 1985-87.\textsuperscript{165} This polarized the already indifferent FARC-EP leadership from committing to a voluntary disarmament or extended peace. During the initial negotiation phase of the Acuerdo de La Uribe, the FARC-EP debated the prospect of voluntarily disarmament in order cultivate “working-trust” and successful reintegration.\textsuperscript{166} As they transitioned into the UP, they assessed as an organization in late 1984 to renegotiate the agreement’s stipulations

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{161} Pruitt. “Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks,” 248-250.
  \item \textsuperscript{162} Reed, Parker, and Weissbrodt. “Major Developments in 1990 at the UN Commission on Human Rights,” 583.
  \item \textsuperscript{163} Paul, Nader. “Former Members’ Perspectives Are Key to Impacting the FARC.” Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 1 (01 2013): 73–83.
  \item \textsuperscript{165} Ibid, 821, 826.
  \item \textsuperscript{166} Ibid, 828-830.
\end{itemize}
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to include disarmament and weapons disposal.\textsuperscript{167} However, as FARC-EP and UP members were killed by the military and or paramilitary forces disarmament became an non-negotiable.\textsuperscript{168}

Had Betancur’s government initially maintained the “working-trust” by respecting the ceasefire of the 1984 agreement, he could have created a domino effect that would’ve allowed the FARC-EP to voluntarily disarm. “Readiness” theory asserts that during insurgent peace negotiations, optimism must be cultivated to enact positive expectations from both sides.\textsuperscript{169} This was absent between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP in 1984 as they both hindered optimistic expectations of one another as they continued to violate the ceasefire. A respected ceasefire is imperative for creating the conditions for a voluntary disarmament. Furthermore, the sequence between these variables promotes the “working-trust” relationship and establishes the appropriate motivation and optimism for both sides to negotiate expanded terms. Voluntarily disarmament is essential for supporting the reintegration process of an insurgent peace agreement. Unfortunately, the 1984 agreement was not able to set a firm foundation with a respected ceasefire, thus, the agreement could not feasibly reach a voluntary insurgent disarmament or protected reintegration process.

The Acuerdo Político ceasefire in 1990 was supervised by an impartial third-party commission. The Comisión de la Internacional Socialista (CIS) was made responsible for overseeing and regulating the M-19 peace process.\textsuperscript{170} Requested by the M-19 in hopes to avoid a UP fate, the commission run by Socialist International supervised the Colombian government's armed security forces’ movements and operations in order to verify the

\textsuperscript{167} Boudon, “Guerrillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process,” 286–87.  
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid, 286  
\textsuperscript{170} “Acuerdo Político entre el Gobierno Nacional, los Partidos Políticos, el M 19, y la Iglesia Católica en Calidad de Tutora Moral y Espiritual del Proceso,” 3-4.
government's compliance.¹⁷¹ As an international organization dedicated to establishing democratic socialist dialogue and trust within or between warring countries, the CIS reported that during its mediation both sides abided by the agreement with insignificant insurrections.¹⁷² The “working-trust” relationship cultivated between the government and M-19 crafted an environment that resulted in realistic agreement concessions and optimistic mechanisms that could adequately deploy these stipulations. This variable within the peace agreement helped provide a positive foundation for the extended 1990 peace strategy.

The inclusion of an impartial and autonomous commission to oversee the ceasefire established a productive “working-trust” between the two warring factions. The M-19 made third-party supervision by the CIS a non-negotiable within the agreement after having witnessed the difficulties the FARC-EP experienced in 1984. By doing so the M-19 proactively established the optimistic and motivating sequence of events that established the “working-trust” between them and the Colombian government. The transparency and respect of the ceasefire produced outcomes that decreased government-guerilla violence. Unlike the three initial years of the 1984 agreement, between 1990 and 1993 the M-19 and the Colombian government pacified relations, clashing for the last time in November of 1990.¹⁷³ This cultivated “working-trust” allowed the M-19 and the Colombian government to negotiate specific conditions within the Acuerdo Político and the soon-to-be 1991 Colombian constitution. The M-19 and the Colombian government were aware of each other’s

¹⁷¹ Socialist International. “Resolution of Support for Peace in Colombia.”
¹⁷² Ibid.
¹⁷³ Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas, “The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict,” 420.
motivations and optimism throughout the process, however, their concerns were put at ease by the reliability of a third-party facilitator (CIS), by cause of the M-19.174

By the end of 1989 and early 1990, the M-19 and the Colombian government had established enough trust and communication with one another that the M-19 began to voluntarily disarm and transition from a militant organization into a political party, Alianza Democrática M-19 (AD/M-19).175 As mentioned, prior, the lack of a voluntary disarmament places both warring factions into positions of insecurity and fear. As was in 1984 between the FARC-EP and the Colombian government, the M-19 was indifferent about trusting the government in this peace process. As such, President Virgilio Barco and the M-19 made it an objective to construct a political peace and democracy pact during negotiations that would emphasize transparency among the government, M-19 and Colombian society.176 Barco and the M-19’s pact helped create a safe environment for weapons policy solutions and incorporated consequences for insubordinate government forces.177 This gave the M-19 confidence in the administration and the process of demobilization in that they still had negotiating leverage and control over their security. This proved to be an effective strategy as by 1992 the M-19 had successfully demobilized and disposed of their weapons to the UN and CIS.

Unlike the 1984 peace agreement, the Colombian government and the M-19 learned from past mistakes by emphasizing optimistic expectations and a “working-trust”

176 García Durán, Grabe and Hormaza, M-19’s Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic Politics: Striving to Keep the Revolution Connected to the People, 25.
177 Ibid, 25.
relationships within the Acuerdo Político. By doing so, a sequence arouse out the ceasefire that created conditions for a voluntary insurgent disarmament. The transparent and productive relationship between the two factions along with a reassuring third-party supervisor afforded the M-19 the security to disarm and progress to the reintegration phase of the peace agreement. The M-19, although cautious, understood that the peace and reintegration process was theirs to dictate as the Colombian people and the government felt confident with the insurgent group’s motives.\textsuperscript{178} This confidence further reinforced the positive expectations and motives the two warring factions shared with one another as the following phase of the peace agreement began.

Mirroring the mistake of the Acuerdo de La Uribe of 1984, the Acuerdo de San Francisco in 2001 established a partisan ceasefire. The responsibility of supervising the 2001 ceasefire was split between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP.\textsuperscript{179} The Colombian government was responsible for regulating and overseeing the Colombian military while the FARC-EP oversaw their military component. Unlike the 1990 agreement, the 2001 agreement lacked an impartial third-party supervisor that could transparently convey compliant data to the FARC-EP and the Colombian government. Due to the lack of “working-trust” the separate and noncooperative ceasefire commissions often accused one another of violating the terms of the truce.\textsuperscript{180} Between the beginning of the ceasefire in October of 2001 and the collapse of the agreement in 2002, President Pastrana and FARC-EP

\textsuperscript{179} “Acuerdo de San Francisco de La Sombra para Concretar y Consolidar el Proceso de Paz,” 3.
leader Manuel Marulanda Vélez wrote nine letters to each other accusing one another of violating the truce. 181

Akin to the Colombian military in 1984, the FARC-EP in 2001 took advantage of their ceasefire regulation power and frequently attacked the Colombian military as a result. In 2001-02 during the ceasefire the FARC-EP and the Colombian government clashed 900 times, more than any other year up to that point in time. 182 The segment of the FARC-EP supervising their side of the ceasefire called the Secretariat of the Central High Command had been identified in promoting hundreds of different attacks on government and civilian targets within that year. 183 What further complicated the oversight of the ceasefire was El Caguán DMZ, the nearly 42,000 km plot of land dedicated exclusively for the FARC-EP. 184 The Colombian military was not allowed to enter this plot of land regardless of an attack that may have originated within it. 185 This sidelined the Colombian military and left them open to any attack from the FARC-EP without consequence. Echoing the same environment and sentiment of the 1984 agreement, the constant violation of the ceasefire in 2001 doomed any “working-trust” communication to negotiate extended peace or voluntarily disarmament.

In 2001 due to the weakness of the Colombian government and military, the FARC-EP were able to capitalize and exploit the peace process to exempt disarmament. Due to the prospect of keeping El Caguán DMZ and maintaining armament, the FARC-EP had ulterior motivations to negotiate peace with the government. The legacy of the 1984 agreement where FARC-EP and UP politicians were slaughtered was still fresh in the minds of many of

181 “Center for International Policy.”
182 Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas, “The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict,” 420.
185 Ibid, 820.
the FARC-EP leader and members.\textsuperscript{186} During the 2001 negotiations Marulanda Vélez asserted that disarmament was a non-negotiable and Pastrana conceded, thus, producing what is today known as the “Caguán Script.”\textsuperscript{187} By keeping the weapons and allowing the FARC-EP to operate fluidly the Colombian government set themselves up for disaster. By arbitration the government could not legally enter the DMZ and by allowing the FARC-EP to keep their weapons the Colombian military was overpowered. Due to societal pressure, Pastrana demanded the FARC-EP disarm and dispose of their weapons, however, by this time the Colombian military has been depleted and demoralized within the country’s rural region.\textsuperscript{188} In 2002, the agreement and the Pastrana peace strategy collapsed after just one year.\textsuperscript{189}

While Pastrana and fellow Colombian government officials failed to provide an effective peace strategy, FARC-EP actions suggest enigmatic motivations and noncompliance. It is hard to say whether the FARC-EP truly wanted peace with the Colombian government or used the process to progress their objectives. However, “readiness” theory would suggest that the FARC-EP wanted both, a peace agreement, but one that heavily favored the insurgent organization. The FARC-EP wanted political legitimacy, participation and security, among other things, when negotiating the peace deal. Unfortunately, the indifferences within the FARC-EP and the lack of accountability of both sides adhering to the ceasefire could not produce a secure environment for voluntarily disarmament or a “working-trust.” As a result, Marulanda Vélez’s insistence on armament

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{186} Ibid, 826-827; Nader, “Former Members’ Perspectives Are Key to Impacting the FARC,” 75-80.  
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid, 827.  
\textsuperscript{188} Nader, “Former Members’ Perspectives Are Key to Impacting the FARC,” 74; Gomez-Suarez and Newman, "Safeguarding Political Guarantees in the Colombian Peace Process: Have Santos and FARC Learnt the Lessons from the Past?” 820.  
\textsuperscript{189} Valenzuela, "The End of the Armed Conflict in Colombia: A Multiple Causal Factor Explanation," 212-13.}
along with Pastrana’s concession towards extending the timeframe of the DMZ all but guaranteed skepticism from both sides during the process. The lack of transparency between Pastrana and Vélez, and the frequent violation of the ceasefire, which could have been mitigated by a third-party supervisor, ensured no optimistic expectations or “working-trust” relationship. By 2002, there were no indicators that the ceasefire was producing a sequence that could allow disarmament, thus, an effective insurgent peace strategy was far from securable.

Without impartially supervised ceasefires and or voluntary disarmament mechanisms, the Colombian government and insurgency organizations cannot adequately establish positive expectations or a “working-trust” relationships to prevent future force-on-force engagements. Under the “readiness” theory approach the creation of working-trust between the two warring factions is imperative for constructive dialogue and concession approval.\(^\text{190}\)

Under the guise of motivation and optimism, the two influencing factors for internal strife negotiations, the FARC-EP and the Colombian government in 1984 and 2001 failed to establish this transparent bilateral communication, thus, resulting in illegitimate and unmotivated ceasefire processes that could not sequence in a voluntarily disarmament process (variables A and C). Whereas, in 1990, the mutual productivity of the M-19 and the Colombian government afforded them an impartial third-party supervisor of which sequenced an environment that supported a voluntary disarmament. This curbed increasing violence and helped produce the first stages of an effective peace process strategy (variables B and D).

Reintegration Protections:

The Acuerdo de La Uribe in 1984 did not provide a guaranteed protection plan for demobilized FARC-EP members. When the FARC-EP and the Colombian government finally established terms for the agreement, the reintegration protections were left unaddressed. Details regarding the security of Patriotic Union politicians (UP) (reference subsection two of “context”) and demobilizing FARC-EP members in 1984 amounted to oral agreements between Betancur and FARC-EP leadership, not written arbitration.\footnote{Gomez-Suarez and Newman, "Safeguarding Political Guarantees in the Colombian Peace Process: Have Santos and FARC Learnt the Lessons from the Past?" 826.} The Acuerdo de La Uribe only asserts that the Colombian government would allow the FARC-EP to transition into a political party that would be guaranteed legislative seats and equal participation.\footnote{“Acuerdo de La Uribe,” 2-3.} Betancur did create an unofficial security force that would occasionally protect the FARC-EP and UP members. The issue was that since there was no formal agreement, these security forces often deserted post or even attempted to kill UP and FARC-EP members under their protection.\footnote{Gomez-Suarez and Newman, "Safeguarding Political Guarantees in the Colombian Peace Process: Have Santos and FARC Learnt the Lessons from the Past?" 824.}

The lack of formal and guaranteed protections for the FARC-EP and UP politicians resulted in severe political violence. Between 1984 and 1988, 3,000 demobilized FARC-EP members, activists, and newly fitted UP politicians had been assassinated.\footnote{Ibid, 824; William M. LeoGrande, and Kenneth E. Sharpe. “Two Wars or One?: Drugs, Guerrillas, and Colombia’s New Violencia.” \textit{World Policy Journal} 17, no. 3 (2000): 4.} The carnage was so severe that Amnesty International charged the Colombian military and members of
the government with supporting a “deliberate policy of political murder.”

In 1986, after unsuccessfully demanding the government provide official security, the FARC-EP assessed that they would need to administer their own protections. The FARC-EP along with the UP leadership wanted the agreement to succeed as it produced unprecedented political influence for them to utilize, however, growing insubordination within the government and insurgency ranks undermined the process. Grouped with a partisan ceasefire, pressure of disarmament and reluctant government protections, the FARC-EP rearmed in 1988 and officially left the UP. Doing so reversed the reintegration process and contributed to the overall collapse of the Acuerdo de La Uribe. By 1991, the embattled UP became a fringe political party, amassing little political power or traction.

The Acuerdo Político of 1990 established a detailed plan for transition, reintroduction, and security for disarming M-19 members. After watching the carnage unravel the UP, President Barco and the M-19 agreed that reintegration required guaranteed protection. Within the Acuerdo Político the Colombian government and the M-19 worked together to detail the Plan de Seguridad which provided an official security force for AD/M-19 politicians (reference subsection three of “context”) and demobilized M-19 members along with a multi-generational protection plan for M-19 families. The protection plan, demanded and primarily tailored by M-19 leadership, ensured throughout the DDR process that the M-19 would be protected and supported both with security and economic

196 LeoGrande, and Sharpe. “Two Wars or One?: Drugs, Guerrillas, and Colombia’s New Violencia,” 4-5.
197 Holmes, de Pin Amin Gutiérrez, and Curtin. Guns, Drugs, and Development in Colombia, 44-45.
198 “Acuerdo Político entre el Gobierno Nacional, los Partidos Políticos, el M 19, y la Iglesia Católica en Calidad de Tutora Moral y Espiritual del Proceso,” 3-4.
However, the AD/M-19 did suffer from political violence, for example, their founder and leader Carlos Pizzaro Leongómez during his 1990 presidential bid was assassinated by a purported narco assassin. During a flight from Bogotá to Barranquilla, Pizzaro was shot twice mid-flight allegedly by a Medellin Cartel hitman, however, the case remains unsolved with no verdict as conflicting information has even suggested assigned bodyguards had a role in his murder. Nonetheless, Between 1990-93 the UP and M-19 suffered a little over 200 assassinations in comparisons with the UP and FARC-EP’s 3,000. The statistical success of a guaranteed reintegration process within the DDR pinpoints its importance and effectiveness for an insurgent peace agreement.

The transition from guerilla organization to political party due to the Plan de Seguridad resulted in the successful end of the M-19 as an armed organization. The priority placed on the M-19’s security by Barco cultivated the “working-trust” the organization had with the government and society. During the transition and reintegration process of the M-19 co-founder Vera Grabe stated, “people took the process to heart, warming to the personality of Pizarro, which reaffirmed the decision to make peace and confirmed that building a political option was a real possibility. For this reason, the M-19 never doubted the process, despite the many uncertainties and obstacles.” Within that quote, Grabe indirectly pinpoints the optimism and “working-trust” between the Colombian government and her

199 Ibid, 3-4.
organization. This is essential within the development of an effective peace process strategy and become more evident under President Gaviria (1990-94). During the constitution drafting of 1991, President Gaviria upheld the stipulations required by the Acuerdo Político and invited M-19’s President Antonio Navarro Wolff to help draft the document.204 Moving forward, President Gaviria even used the Acuerdo Político and AD/M-19 members for advice regarding his own insurgent peace agreements with other insurgent groups like the ELN.205 A such, the 1990 Acuerdo Político serves as an example for what can come out of a productive relationship that emphasizes shared responsibility between the Colombian government and an insurgency group.

The Acuerdo de San Francisco of 2001 did not offer protections or channels for societal reintegration for demobilized FARC-EP members even though they had been requested. Unlike the 1990 agreement, the 2001 FARC-EP agreement lacked mechanisms to protect the FARC-EP members.206 The legacy of the 1984 agreement was very much present during the negotiations thereby hindering the leverage the Colombian government had with the FARC-EP. Yet, instead of deliberating more on reintegration protections and processes, the FARC-EP and Colombian government extended El Caguán DMZ.207 As “readiness” theory would support, the FARC-EP’s motivation behind this extension was likely due to the opportunity and optimism given to them by their overt military advantage over the Colombian government. Therefore, the Acuerdo de San Francisco acted more as a disguise for rising violence than a process of reintegration. The war intensified significantly, self-

205 Brooke, “Gaviria’s Gamble.”
207 LeoGrande, and Sharpe. “Two Wars or One?: Drugs, Guerrillas, and Colombia’s New Violencia,” 6-7.
determined demobilizing FARC-EP member were slaughtered, and Colombian soldiers were either killed or kidnapped for years.\footnote{Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas, “The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict,” 418-423.}

The absence of a detailed reintegration process or protections left the agreement powerless and frankly, useless. The Pastrana administration’s omittance of the FARC-EP’s reintegration protections or a detailed DDR processes was severely detrimental to peace. Moreover, the request by the FARC-EP to establish themselves as a politically legitimate entity with protections was instead delayed and suggested to be added within a newer agreement. However, the FARC-EP share reasonability for the downturn of the peace strategy and the reluctance of the Pastrana administration to employ a reintegration process. The FARC-EP knew El Caguán DMZ disrupted any “working-trust” or positive expectations the Colombian government could have with the group when discussing reintegration. In order to form an effective peace strategy Pastrana and the FARC-EP needed to assert that it was time for formal protected reintegration like in 1990. Furthermore, Pastrana and the FARC-EP should not have even considered an extended DMZ considering both their reluctances to supervise it. Alas, internal division within the organization and the Colombian government produced little support for a reintegration process and gave FARC-EP members little to no motivation and optimism to follow through with the agreement. The Acuerdo de San Francisco lacked those DDR details that could have enforced or provided proof of concept for the FARC-EP to adhere or believe in. Nonetheless, the FARC-EP and the Pastrana government share the responsibility for the failure of the 2001-2002 peace agreement.

By comparing elements of the three peace agreements (Table III), I demonstrate a relationship between the independent variables B (impartial third-party supervisor), D
(voluntarily disarmament), and E (reintegration protections) with direct contribution towards
the success of the M-19 peace agreement. Variables B, D, and E can also be considered,
within the Colombian Conflict, as the most promising insurgency peace process strategy
considering their effectiveness to efficiently demobilize a Colombian insurgent organization.
Under the same conditions as the 1990 agreement, the 1984 and 2001 peace agreements were
not able to achieve the same result. As such, the 1984 and 2001 agreements have inverse
independent variables in relation to the Acuerdo Político of 1990. It is for that reason the
Acuerdo Político of 1990 remains one of the two successful Colombian insurgent peace
agreement in the over 60-year conflict.

A combination of an impartial third-party supervisor (B), voluntarily disarmament
(D), and a guaranteed protected reintegration process (F) will likely produce the most
effective peace process strategy for crafting and maintaining a Colombian insurgency peace
agreement. When comparing the peace process strategies of the 1984, 1990 and 2001 peace
agreements, the M-19 peace strategy is the most successful. The 1984 and 2001 FARC-EP
agreements are almost identical in nature even with a nearly 20-year difference between
them. The two FARC-EP agreements lacked the ability to craft an environment for a
“working-trust” relationship as “readiness” theory would assert, which is essential to
maintain dialogue and eventual demobilization. On the contrary, the 1990 M-19 agreement
cultivated each of these independent variables to help provide a solid foundation and
framework for continued peace and eventual success. For that reason, the Colombian
government and the M-19 share responsibility for the successful outcome of the accord.
(I) Conclusion

The presence of an impartial ceasefire supervisor, voluntarily disarmament and a protected reintegration process is an effective insurgent peace strategy within Colombia. An impartial ceasefire supervisor like the CIS reduces the insecurities held by both sides during a period of negotiation. The existence of this impartial third party allows the warring factions to be accountable for their own forces and focus mainly on negotiating peace terms. The Acuerdo Político of 1990 proves this because instead of accusing one another, the Colombian government and the M-19 were able to craft a “working trust” that allowed them to reach terms and voluntarily disarmament. Voluntary disarmament is essential for Colombian peace agreements as it still preserves the negotiating leverage of insurgent groups. Having this leverage during negotiations affords the insurgencies the ability to protect themselves against insubordinate government security forces and or paramilitaries. Allowing the insurgencies to protect themselves during this process further reinforces the “working trust” and “optimism” between the Colombian government and the insurgency organization. The 1984 and 2001 agreements lacked this variable during the peace agreements. Thus, many Colombian soldiers and FARC-EP guerillas were killed amid the negotiation process and throughout the agreement’s span, further undermining the accord.

A protected and guaranteed reintegration process for demobilizing guerilla members is imperative for prolonged peace. The slaughter of unprotected demobilized UP members of
the FARC-EP created a legacy that hindered the FARC-EP from trusting the government with their protection ever again. Identified as Betancur’s largest flaw within the agreement process and the subsequent three-year peace, the lack of protections pigeonholed the FARC-EP into recidivism. The 2001 agreement under the Pastrana Administration reinforces this point as during his negotiations with the FARC-EP he was not able to extend protections because he would or could not control the paramilitaries.\textsuperscript{209} As a result, the war ensued and thousands more of Colombians would die. The Acuerdo Político of 1990 even with its shortcomings, was able to protect the demobilizing M-19 members and AD/M-19 politicians from paramilitary harm, thus, helping legitimize the Colombian democratic process and cement the prospect of permanent peace.

Cultivating peace in Colombia is no easy feat as it has only experienced three successful peace agreements and numerous other failures. The Acuerdo Político in 1990, the Acuerdo Final with the EPL in 1991, and the Acuerdo de Santa Fe de Ralito with the AUC in 2003 are the only three agreements that have been deemed successful for having completely demobilized and reintegrated their respective organizations. Yet, while they are successful, they are very different from one another as I remarked in the “case selection” portion of my research. Navigating through their respective domestic and international barriers makes the likelihood of their successes even more doubtful. Currently, the 2016 CPA is the newest and third attempt for expanded peace in Colombia between its government and the FARC-EP. Much like its predecessors, the 2016 CPA agreement underwent a difficult process on its way towards ratification. However, by reflecting upon former Colombian peace processes, the agreement was able to produce an effective strategy.

\textsuperscript{209} Livingstone and Pearce, \textit{Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War}. 66.
The drafters of the 2016 CPA derived their inspiration from the lessons learned during the processes of the Acuerdo de La Uribe, Acuerdo Político and the Acuedo de San Francisco. In September of 2012, the Santos administration and FARC-EP leadership began to negotiate terms of peace under specific conditions. Starting with lessons from the Acuedo de San Francisco, the Colombian government refused to recreate conditions produced by Pastrana’s “Caguán Script.” Considered part of the “triangle of lessons” learned from the 2001 peace process, the Santos administration and the FARC-EP agreed that talks had to occur outside of Colombia, and a ceasefire would only be implemented during the final phases and execution of the agreement. This would allow both sides the negotiating leverage and security whilst the peace process was being deliberated. Furthermore, it allowed the Colombian government and FARC-EP to defend themselves against insubordinate forces without compromising the peace process.

Using lessons from the Acuerdo Político, the FARC-EP and the Colombian government agreed that a third-party verification committee was necessary for overseeing the temporary and eventually permanent ceasefire. The Santos administration and Timoleón ‘Timochenko’ Jiménez, leader of the FARC-EP, agreed on a “system of cross-witnessing” which invited Chile and Venezuela as facilitators for the ceasefire, with Norway and Cuba as guarantors. As argued prior, the presence of an impartially supervised ceasefire builds the “working-trust” and the optimistic expectation “readiness” theory suggests as essential for effective peace negations. As such, this “system of cross-witnessing” for the ceasefire

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211 Ibid, 826.
resulted in a sequence that cultivated an environment for a voluntary disarmament. By late 2015 into early 2016, the FARC-EP had voluntarily agreed to disarm and dispose of their weapons under the observance of the government, FARC-EP, and a political mission from the U.N. consisting of members within the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).

Building upon the sequence of events produced by the ceasefire and disarmament, the drafters of the 2016 CPA crystalized the agreement with lessons learned from the Acuerdo de La Uribe and Acuerdo Político. As the peace process entered its final phase, the Santos administration and the FARC-EP wanted to ensure there was a proper and effective social reintegration process for the demobilizing FARC-EP members. By establishing a restrictive 5-point agreed agenda, the Colombian government and the FARC-EP created a DDR process that offered protections for soon-to-be FARC-EP politicians, amnesty for members and leadership, guaranteed legislative seats, political support and economic assistance. The FARC-EP and the Colombian government wanted to avoid a 1984-style collapse of the 2016 CPA because of negligent protections and support for reintegration. Thus, by respecting the legacies produced by the Acuerdo de La Uribe and the Acuerdo Político, the 2016 CPA was able to include an impressive but controversial DDR process.

The agreement was officially signed in Havana, Cuba on August 24, 2016 and issued in a new chapter of peace and stability within the region. Albeit fragile, the peace created by the 2016 CPA derived from the trial and errors experienced by previous attempts at peace in Colombia. One can argue that the attempts, failed and successful, by previous

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213 “Acuerdo Final Para La Terminación Del Conflicto y La Construcción De Una Paz Estable y Duradera,” 60-61.
administration should be acknowledged for producing lessons for future generations. The Colombian government, FARC-EP and international participants used these aforementioned agreements for instruction that resulted in an effective peace strategy. Unfortunately, with the arrival of Duque’s Administration in 2018, the 2016 CPA is becoming more reminiscent of the 1984 FARC-EP agreement than the 1990 M-19 accord. Demobilizing FARC-EP member have been targeted by new paramilitary organizations and or Colombian security forces. Moreover, the promises designated within the 2016 CPA remain unfulfilled, thus, forcing current FARC-EP members to recidivate, cultivating dissidents within their organization.

The United Nations and various watchdog organization have identified Colombia as a region of concern for 2020. As the Colombian government continues to neglect its promises made to the FARC-EP, the FARC-EP has grown frustrated and divided. The largest remaining insurgency group after the FARC-EP, the ELN, has offered to incorporate FARC-EP dissidents to grow its base and orchestrate their own attacks. On January 17, 2019 the ELN detonated a car bomb outside the General Santander National Police Academy in Bogotá, Colombia killing 22 people and injuring 68 others. This was the deadliest attack in the nation since 2003 and stoked fears that the nightmares of the conflict had returned. More pressure was placed on the Duque administration on November 21, 2019 after the largest protests in recent decades struck the country demanding the government to adhere to

218 Ibid.
the 2016 CPA with the FARC-EP, tackled corruption and an economic downturn.\textsuperscript{221} It is hard to tell whether the 2016 CPA will last through these times of tribulations. However, under what I uncovered in my investigation; the signs show that the 2016 CPA is making the same mistakes of the failed 1984 Acuerdo de la Uribe. The most notable flaw is the Colombian government’s lack of adequate protection for the demobilizing FARC-EP members. Without adequate protections, the agreement is on course to capitulate unless measures are taken to rebuild a “working-trust” with the FARC-EP and either adhere to the existing terms or renegotiate them in good-faith.

(II) Reflections:

Each of these agreements were drafted and signed under differing international scenarios that likely influenced their peace strategies. The 1984 Acuerdo de La Uribe was created during the Cold War Era and would have certainly received competing influence from the United States, the Soviet Union and other nations. For example, the War on Drugs under U.S. President Ronald Reagan (1981-89) often influenced Colombian legislation as the U.S. shifted to become Colombia’s largest international aid provider.\textsuperscript{222} Attempting to counterbalance this influence, the Cuban government often trained and funded various insurgencies like the M-19, EPL or insubordinate FARC-EP members to helped undermine


the 1984 peace process.\textsuperscript{223} It is also widely believed that the Soviet Union supported Cuba’s efforts in the region, and at times even trained FARC-EP leadership.\textsuperscript{224} Nonetheless, the outcome of the 1984 agreement illustrates the influence of American foreign policy on Colombian leadership. This was made evident in 1985 where after the ratification of the Acuerdo de La Uribe, President Reagan and Betancur affirmed allegiance to one another in front of the media on the south lawn of the White House.\textsuperscript{225} As such, it is presumable the Cold War had direct influence on the strategies employed for the 1984 peace process and agreement.

Soviet international retrenchment at the end of the Cold War likely influenced the support and speed of the Acuerdo Político’s peace agreement strategy. With reduced financial support from the Cuban government as per the immediate Soviet collapse, the M-19 was no longer receiving the same amount of economic aid or training it had experienced in the early to mid-1980’s.\textsuperscript{226} Thus, on the verge of peace negotiations with the Colombian government, Pizarro flew to Cuba in 1989 for the Guerilla Coordinating Board in hopes to receive the Cuban government’s support for the group’s imminent peace process.\textsuperscript{227} It is still unknown today if the Cuban government offered their support considering Pizzaro’s silence on the topic, however, during the Acuerdo Político’s process the M-19 did receive logistical support from Panama and Venezuela, along with political support from Costa Rica and

\textsuperscript{224} Central Intelligence Agency. “Soviet Policies and Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean.” 17.
\textsuperscript{227} Durán, Grabe and Hormaza. \textit{M-19’s Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic Politics: Striving to Keep the Revolution Connected to the People}, 19.
Mexico. The Colombian government on the other hand was engaged in a financial feud with the United States due to the War on Drugs and the U.S. foreign policy pivot towards eastern Europe. With tight fiscal budgets affecting the Colombian government and the M-19, the peace process was likely expedited as to not exhaust funds or cultivate new resentment. Moreover, with the combination of Soviet retrenchment and an increase of U.S. tensions with Colombia, an environment was likely created for Latin American nations to exert their own influence and agendas on the M-19 peace process.

Amid the start of the Pink Tide in Latin America (1998-2009), the Acuerdo de San Francisco was caught in the middle of a regional political and ideological shift. Similar to the Acuerdo de La Uribe and the Acuerdo Político, the Acuerdo de San Francisco had to navigate international actors attempting to perform on their foreign policy interests. Between 2000-2001, the United States, Cuba, Venezuela, Panama, Brazil and Mexico had all been employing their specific foreign policy interest within Colombia in attempts to either support Pastrana or the FARC-EP. The U.S. committed $1.3 billion towards Plan Colombia to help the Pastrana administration’s 2001 peace agreement, while Cuba and Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela provided the FARC-EP with logistical and economic assistance to keep war waging. In a surprise twist however, the Colombian government and the FARC-EP during the peace negotiation invited 26 “friendly governments” to receive bimonthly bulletins

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228 Ibid, 15.
regarding the peace process.\textsuperscript{232} Even so, as left-wing populism spread across Latin America, the Colombian government shifted farther to the right, whereby the end of 2001, bimonthly bulletins had been dismissed along with any left-wing populist governments attempting to support the process. The ideological shift on the region under the Pink Tide likely increased insecurity from the conservative Colombian government during peace negotiations. Moreover, the drastic regional shift could have influenced the strategies and ultimate decision to end peace negotiations in 2001.

Furthermore, while my investigation contains high levels of internal validity, its conclusions can be applied to a broader discussion on insurgent peace processes in Latin America. Internal validity within is what directly explains relevant causal relationships, or the cause and effect of confounding variables, which in this case are the independent variables mentioned within this monograph. Whereas, external validity is the level of how applicable the results of this experiment are elsewhere, like in greater Latin America. Based on the methodology of this monograph, the project utilized three insurgent peace agreements, one that succeeded, and two that failed. These agreements all derive from Colombia in a period of intense civil engagement and borderline failure. These agreements were analyzed through the perspective of the Colombian Conflict context and not a broader context of insurgencies throughout Latin America. However, it can be beneficial to conduct a comparative analysis of the conclusion derived from this argument with similar insurgent cases in Latin America such as in El Salvador with the insurgent FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) or the insurgent PSN (Nicaragua Socialist Party) in Nicaragua. However, these cases are different, and while similarities may show between them, these

\textsuperscript{232} Kline, \textit{Showing Teeth to the Dragons: State-Building by Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez, 2002-2006}, 94.
patterns should be investigated diligently as not to address and argument within false uniqueness.

Nonetheless, I recognize that there are alternative explanations that could be complementary or unrelated to the variables I outlined as being integral for an effective insurgent peace agreement inside Colombia. Along with international scenarios, an example of this is the presence of the Roman Catholic Church in peace agreements within Colombia. As I collected data from these three peace agreements and read others, the Roman Catholic Church was present in nearly all accords regardless of their insurgency or paramilitary purpose. A probable outcome for the church's presence in these agreements could be due to a wave of liberation theology in Latin America in the 1970s and the legacy it left behind. In all, the ability to use this monograph’s result and compare it with similar cases throughout Latin America is beneficial, however, it should be taken with caution. Nevertheless, my research should encourage others to continue to uncover variables that not only explain what make insurgent peace agreement strategies in Colombia effective, but how those variables may also be effective towards crafting insurgent peace strategies in other Latin American nations.
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