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Manufacturing Local Identification behind the Iron Curtain in Sevastopol, Ukraine after World War II

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Since 1991, Sevastopol, an ethnically Russian city in Ukraine, has been undergoing a re-examination of its heritage. On the eve of Ukraine's 'Orange Revolution' in 2004, one could see a graffitied wall on Soviet Street that read: 'Sevastopol is Russia.' Graffiti is a common form of self-expression, but it can also be a political statement. The persistence of the name 'Soviet Street,' which ends at a large statue of Vladimir Lenin that towers over the city, also seemed anachronistic in democratic and independent Ukraine. Cities throughout eastern Europe have been westernizing by erecting glass and steel skyscrapers while also destroying remnants of the communist past by tearing down buildings and statues and renaming streets and squares.¹ Although many post-Soviet cities have removed traces of the Bolsheviks and the communist past, Sevastopol retains street names and Lenin's statue still looks down over the city from the central hill. Because after World War II Sevastopol's urban biography preferred two centuries of war heroism over revolutions, the city's local history survived in a way that was virtually impossible for many other cities in eastern Europe after the collapse of communist governments. It should not surprise us then that the streets of Sevastopol were filled with joyous revellers in March 2014 as Crimea voted to be annexed by Russia.

We often assume that only democracies allow for public participation and that dictatorships, especially the heavy-handed rule of Joseph Stalin, would not allow any interference from outside the elite. Scholars, particularly social historians, of the Soviet Union have been challenging this misconception for decades. The case study of urban planning and rebuilding in Sevastopol, Ukraine, shows much contestation and negotiation between local and national authorities that resulted in a resilient urban biography that outlasted changes in governments and ideologies.

Sevastopol, home to the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, suffered 97 per cent destruction in World War II, and planners in Moscow and Sevastopol had very different visions of what should arise from the ashes. With the war over, a centre-periphery battle ensued to control the planning of the city. Life in the rubble was harsh—people lived in caves, dugouts, bank vaults, and elevator shafts for years after the war—but local officials, conscious of the city's past military history and future importance as a Cold War naval base, consistently flouted the law and sought to accommodate the local population with the few resources at hand. With so much of the pre-war population evacuated, at the front, or killed, access to labour became a major bottleneck for reconstruction. In repopulating the city, planners also realized that they needed to reforge the city's urban biography to provide a sense of place for war-weary residents and thereby create a more stable labour pool. A clear narrative (or shared memory) eventually emerged, but it was not without debate and challenges. As with all myths, this one was flexible and adaptable to

¹ John Czaplicka, Nida Gelazis, Blair Ruble, eds., *Cities after the Fall of Communism: Reshaping Cultural Landscapes and European Identity* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009) presents case studies in post-communist eastern European cities in which changes in toponyms were often central.

changing circumstances. What one might call ‘local memory’ was a confluence of lived experience, centrally created propaganda, and local residents’ need to have a sense of direction and purpose in the past, present and future. For Sevastopol, that purpose was defender of the Motherland and it was made tangible through urban rebuilding and proliferated and perpetuated through, among other media, guidebooks.

The Politics of Replanning a Destroyed City

Destroyed cities were a central concern as the regime sought to redefine its relation to society and repair its image in the eyes of the population after nearly thirty years of revolution, civil war, famines, and purges. Reconstructed buildings and reborn cities became new symbols of progress and economic strength. New structures rising from and above the ruins offered more than space for housing, production, convalescence, and education. Each new building was a marker of healing and recovery. Because city-building throughout the Soviet Union was an all-Union affair without international support like the Marshall Plan, it became a leading symbol for the Soviet system’s strength and resilience until the Korean War and beyond. But each of the destroyed cities had its own history and tradition, which also made the rebuilding process intensely local. How could a regime so used to central planning and a command system respond to the need for local memories and identification?

The first instinct of Soviet central government was expected: the formation in Moscow of the Committee on Architectural Affairs to oversee all planning and rebuilding and to ensure proper ‘Soviet’ construction throughout the entire country. Most architects and planners by the 1940s understood ‘Soviet’ to mean grand neo-classical buildings fronting wide avenues named for Marx, Lenin, or revolutionary heroes. This had become the pattern since Moscow had been redesigned a decade earlier.² However, the post-war period was much different. Local architects, planners, historians, and everyday citizens decided to voice their objections to Moscow- and Leningrad-based architects’ visions of what to do with the near *tabula rasa* provided by wartime destruction. Two prominent architects, Grigorii Barkhin and Moisei Ginzburg, represented powerful Moscow-based institutions in a competition to redesign Sevastopol. Ginzburg failed to provide adequate detail for his concept, so Barkhin was granted permission to draft a full reconstruction plan.

Chief city architect Iurii Trautman became the leader of the fight for local customs and traditions. Like Barkhin, Trautman sought to highlight the city’s naval heritage, but he wanted to highlight the city’s past achievements, not just its activity in the latest war. The city’s new architectural style, Trautman argued, should be patterned on the ruins of Khersones (Chersonesus), a 2500-year-old Greek city just outside the city centre. Most of all, Trautman and his staff wanted to eliminate the grandiose monuments and memorials to Stalin and others who had no direct connection to the city and its history. Restoration of Sevastopol’s monuments to past heroes—most importantly Crimean War leaders E. I. Totleben, V. I. Istomin, V. A. Kornilov, and P. S. Nakhimov—took precedence over erecting new memorials to current leaders, and the ancient Greek styles rooted the city’s identity in something much older and awe-inspiring. Trautman and his sense of proportion and history eventually won out over Barkhin.

In a 1945 review of Barkhin’s plan for city squares, a brigade of experts in Moscow echoed local criticisms by noting that the Square of Parades was out of scale with neighbouring

² For more on the Moscow Plan, see Andrew Day ‘The Rise and Fall of Stalinist Architecture’ in James Cracraft and Daniel Rowland, (eds.), *Architectures of Russian Identity, 1500 to the Present* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 172-192.

buildings.³ They complained that the naval buildings and the new Panorama of the Great Patriotic War were much too large.⁴ Barkhin had created inordinately large buildings for agitational purposes, like his 100-meter high ‘Glory’ monument that would have dominated the Square of Parades at the ancient seaside entrance to the city. One review panel saw ‘Glory’ as a hideous eyesore that would disrupt transportation, parades, and demonstrations in one of the most important and beautiful regions of the city.⁵ Barkhin’s sycophantic and enormous statue of Stalin—‘the great organizer and inspiration for victory’—was similarly out of scale.⁶ His redesign of Commune Square, the Square of the Third International, and Malakhov Kurgan also received criticism. Barkhin’s plans for Commune Square impinged on Historical Boulevard, a key defence point during the Crimean War. Malakhov Kurgan, the hilltop site of bloody fighting during the Crimean War that took the lives of several Russian military leaders, was also redesigned as a locus for all the Crimean War memorials in the city, which included moving the headless statue of Totleben and Panorama of the Great Defence from Historical Boulevard. Barkhin attempted to follow contemporary trends of monumental architecture, not knowing that it would be his downfall. The joint conclusion of a three architect review panel went as far as to say that ‘even if one takes into account [Sevastopol’s] significance as a hero-city, a city of two defences,’ the scale of Barkhin’s plan for the city centre was much too large.⁷

Barkhin’s tampering with local sites of remembrance and homage, however, did not withstand local opposition that wanted Crimean War memorials to remain scattered throughout the city rather than concentrated in one area. Trautman, Sevastopol’s new chief architect,⁸ emerged from a November 1945 planning review in Moscow as the bearer of a new vision for the city, one which openly confronted Barkhin’s plan. At the beginning of 1946 Trautman used this opportunity to present his counter plan, ‘A Short Consideration for the Experts on the Draft of the Plan of Sevastopol’s Centre,’ rather than support his newfound rival.⁹ Trautman objected that Barkhin neither knew nor incorporated ‘local conditions and traditions’ in his plan.¹⁰ He condemned Barkhin for planning as if Sevastopol was a blank page on which he could create without consideration for existing buildings, streets, and landmarks. Barkhin’s reduction of

³ Russian State Archive of the Economy (hereafter, RGAE), f. 9432, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 11-12.

⁴ RGAE, f. 9432, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 126-31. Architects were befuddled by confused ‘official’ policy. Whereas monumental architecture was encouraged for agitation, ‘technical planning’ (or planning based on economic models) searched for the most efficient and cost-effective way to accommodate the population.

⁵ RGAE, f. 9432, op. 1, d. 243, ll. 42-43ob.

⁶ State Archive of the City of Sevastopol (hereafter, GAGS), f. R-79, op. 2, d. 30-a, l. 9.

⁷ ‘Hero-city’ was a designation given to cities that had survived long sieges or that had been the location of ‘heroic’ battles. Cities’ place in the pantheon of heroes afforded them high status in the press and special consideration in postwar rebuilding; hero cities were to become monumental sites of remembrance. ‘City of two defenses’ became a common phrase in WW II, linking the battle against the Nazis with the city’s defense in the Crimean War.

⁸ Georgii Aleksandrovich Lomagin, the prewar architectural leader, had been reappointed chief architect in January 1945 by the Directorate of Architecture (GARF f. A-150, op. 2, d. 26, l. 11). On 9 October 1945 the Directorate demoted Lomagin and placed Iurii Andreevich Trautman in his place. At the same time, Trautman’s friend from his school days in Leningrad, Valentin Mikhailovich Artiukhov, became the head of the building inspectorate (GARF f. A-150, op. 2, d. 30, l. 17). This was an obvious attempt to replace a local official with two outsiders from Leningrad. Artiukhov eventually became chief architect and proved to be as ‘local’ in his approach as Trautman. For more on how municipal officials transferred from other regions refashioned themselves into ‘locals,’ see Karl D. Qualls, *From Ruins to Reconstruction: Urban Identity in Soviet Sevastopol after World War II* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2009), pp. 73-80.

⁹ RGAE, f. 9432, op. 1, d. 243a, ll. 52-58; GAGS, f. R-308, op. 1, d. 21, ll. 9-14.

¹⁰ RGAE, f. 9432, op. 1, d. 243a, l. 52.

Primorskii and Michmanskii boulevards—the ‘traditional places of rest for the citizens of Sevastopol and sailors’—for his massive Square of Parades stood out as the ultimate expression of his lack of interest in local tradition.¹¹ Trying to preserve the familiar buildings of the city and to reduce the cost of reconstruction, Trautman admonished Barkhin for proposing the city’s party and government buildings on Commune Square and for widening main traffic arteries.

Trautman made it clear to his audience that Barkhin’s ‘abstract academism’ did not answer the ‘real needs of the city’ and therefore must not be implemented.¹² Trautman urged, on the other hand, that he and his staff ‘rework the draft of the centre on the basis of the *new general directives* and more favourable *initial qualities*.’¹³ The ‘new general directives’ referred to a November 1945 Council of People’s Commissars decree that called for rapid reconstruction of architecturally valuable structures, city centres, housing, and the ‘improvement of the everyday conditions of the population of cities.’¹⁴ Either because Trautman presented a superior plan or because it conformed to the latest wave of official cultural policy, or both, the experts accepted most of his counter plan as the basis for their latest criticism of Barkhin.

Once the local team had stated its case and couched it in the proper language of cultural criticism, a number of men who reviewed the plan began to focus on architectural matters of scale, aesthetics, and symbolism. In April 1946, architect A. Velikanov, while noting the ‘academic and abstract’ characteristics of Barkhin’s plan, also expressed concern for the destruction of Sevastopol’s tradition and history. He pointed out that construction of the Square of Parades would encroach on the

distinctive, customary and most memorable places of Sevastopol [...] ...These places entered literature, all the history of the city is connected with these places, even the city’s heroic defences are connected with them. To change the city’s appearance means to fully destroy it, to make a new city, a different city, a city not having a continuous connection with the old Sevastopol.¹⁵

Velikanov’s attempt to return Sevastopol to its historical roots buttressed Trautman’s arguments and reinforced the foundation for reworking Barkhin’s schemes to meet local demands for preservation of nineteenth-century traditions. Another critic complained that Barkhin’s design was ‘connected neither with the traditions nor scale and character of Sevastopol’s ensemble.’ Moreover, Barkhin had ‘deviated to the point of abstraction’ and his proposal carried the ‘imprint of abstract academism.’¹⁶ Following such charge, the Committee on Architectural Affairs officially rejected Barkhin’s proposal and called for further elaboration by mid-November 1946, seven months later.¹⁷ The battle initiated by local architects and taken up by prominent colleagues in Moscow brought Sevastopol’s demands to the fore. Trautman was able to use official rhetoric espousing individuality (anti-formalism) to justify his recalcitrance to

¹¹ RGAE, f. 9432, op. 1, d. 243a, l. 55.

¹² RGAE, f. 9432, op. 1, d. 243a, l. 57.

¹³ RGAE, f. 9432, op. 1, d. 243a, 57. emphasis mine. Most interesting is Trautman’s use of Zhdanov’s language in his critiques nearly six months before what is generally regarded as the beginning of Zhdanov’s cultural attacks—the 14 August 1946 condemnation of *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*. The use of 1930s-style criticism was revived in the architectural community well before Zhdanov’s pronouncements on formalism and apathetic art.

¹⁴ GARF f. A-150, op. 2, d. 20, l. 1.

¹⁵ RGAE, f. 9432, op. 1, d. 243a, ll. 5-8; GAGS, f. R-308, op. 1, d. 21, ll. 28-31. Quotes from RGAE, f. 9432, op. 1, d. 243a, ll. 8, 7. Note his use of the plural *defenses* to link World War II with the Crimean War.

¹⁶ For the Planning and Construction Directorate’s decision of Barkhin’s plan for the center see RGAE, f. 9432, op. 1, d. 243, ll. 106-10; GAGS, f. R-308, op. 1, d. 21, ll. 55-59; RGAE, f. 9432, op. 1, d. 154, ll. 159-63.

¹⁷ RGAE, f. 9432, op. 1, d. 243, ll. 111-15; RGAE, f. 9432, op. 1, d. 154, ll. 155-58.

Barkhin's ill-informed planning. Likewise, speaking in the name of the population, if not always directly on their behalf, he secured a place for himself in history as the architect of a hero city attuned to its imperial Russian past.¹⁸

Trautman transformed more than just the built environment envisioned by Barkhin; he and his staff used linguistic symbolism as well as geography and aesthetics.¹⁹ The naming and renaming of streets, squares, and parks was an integral part of the post-war program of urban agitation.²⁰ Name changes suggested political shifts. After the revolution Catherine the Great Street had been renamed for Lenin (as it remains today). More telling, however, is the number of streets that after World War II permanently reverted to their pre-revolutionary names. The Soviet obsession with making the revolution omnipresent led to the three streets of the ring road taking the names of Lenin, Marx, and Frunze. During Trautman's replanning, however, the latter two changed to Big Naval and Nakhimov streets. When judged as part of a larger plan, this transformation heralds a new emphasis on local identity, historical depth, and national pride. Civil War commander Mikhail Frunze was essential to Sevastopol's 'liberation' from the Germans and Whites after the revolution, but he was not considered a local hero. Karl Marx, of course, had no direct link to the city, only to its ruling ideology. Admiral Nakhimov, on the other hand, stands atop the pantheon of heroes from the Crimean War for leading the defence. Big Naval Street, much more than Marx, carried the city's identity as a seaside, both military and commercial, port. Although reverting to pre-revolutionary names could be viewed as abandoning socialist goals, it was more important to the city's stability and rapid reconstruction to resurrect a unique, local character to which residents could attach their ideals and aspirations. Socialist competitions to speed reconstruction, therefore, were designed to rebuild Sevastopol the 'hometown' more than socialism, which was not unlike similar retreats to Russian identity during the war.²¹

The names of the city's central squares also went through a radical transformation. Local planners transformed Commune Square to Ushakov, another of the city's admiral-heroes. Whole regions also changed. With the Tatar population forced from the city for allegedly collaborating with the Germans, Tatar Settlement became known as Green Hillock. Buildings also changed. The Karaite Jewish prayer hall became the Spartak sports club; the mosque, with minarets removed and the façade 'erased' of Koranic inscriptions, became the naval archive. The perceived reversion to tradition meant a Russian ethnic identification wrapped in a Greek architectural façade, yet devoid of all hints of competing identifications. Local unity demanded visual unity.

Local specialists also asserted their authority over the form of reconstruction. Tamara Alëshina, the head of the local planning organization argued successfully that Moscow should

¹⁸ Barkhin's daughter continued to argue into the 1980s that her father was the true architect of Sevastopol. See A. G. Barkhina, *G. B. Barkhin*. (Moscow, Stroiizdat, 1981).

¹⁹ For an introduction to the language of built space see Harold D. Lasswell, *The Signature of Power: Buildings, Communication, and Policy* (New Brunswick, Transaction Press, 1979); Diana Agrest and Mario Gandelsonas, 'Semiotics and the Limits of Architecture,' in *A Perfusion of Signs*, Thomas A. Sebeok, ed. (Bloomington, University of Indiana Press, 1977); Donald Prezios, *The Semiotics of the Built Environment: An Introduction to Architectonic Analysis* (Bloomington, University of Indiana Press, 1979).

²⁰ For a comparative perspective of other Soviet name changes, see John Murray, *Politics and Place-Names: Changing Names in the Late Soviet Period* (Birmingham, University of Birmingham, 2000).

²¹ On increasing "Russianness" in the 1930s and after, see David Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2002).

not change the city's main central park into a site for WW II memorials. Her plea noted that plans for Primorskii Boulevard 'must preserve its historically complex arrangement' and to include the well-loved chestnut trees that were marked for destruction in Moscow's plans.²² Teachers demanded more and better schools with proper pedagogical tools. Physicians argued for more beds, x-ray machines, and medicine.²³ Sanitation inspectors wanted more greens spaces, trash collectors, and organized hunting for rabid dogs.²⁴ Factory bosses called for more housing for their workers and better food to increase productivity and reduce labour flight. Architects of course wanted to build beautiful and functional buildings that fit the local character and not central planning schemes.

Everyday urbanites, with their diversity of backgrounds and training, also petitioned local and central officials, in a multitude of ways, to pay attention to local conditions and traditions. One Sevastopol resident lambasted a plan to build the new theatre on the central hill because climbing the icy steps of the hillside in winter would be impossible for the city's elderly.²⁵ Specialists from the nearby archaeological preserve sent sketches of what a 'local' building should look like in order to prevent the typical Soviet five-story apartment block from taking over the city.²⁶ When central authorities began pushing for more and higher construction in the late 1940s, local officials reminded them that Sevastopol sat on a fault line and would suffer a similar fate as Ashkhabad had during the 1948 earthquake.²⁷ Central officials also continued to press for wooden construction into the early 1950s, only to be reminded that this was out of character for the city because there were no nearby forests, but there were abundant stone quarries.²⁸ Sevastopol's officials, specialists, and residents participated in the replanning of their city and foregrounded a local architectural aesthetic and a connection to the city's pre-1917 naval heritage. But how might these ideas have been resonant sixty years later for the graffiti writer who started this chapter?

Guidebooks and the Scripting of the Past

Tour guidebooks are one of the most common ways to transmit a sense of place to a touring audience, even in non-authoritarian regimes.²⁹ Soviet Sevastopol's guidebooks

²² GARF f. A-150, op. 2, d. 254, ll. 38-39.

²³ GAGS f. R-59, op. 1, d. 10, ll. 1-5.

²⁴ GAGS f. R-359, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 32-39ob.

²⁵ See in the column 'Vosstanovym rodnoi Sevastopol v 3-4 goda!' the following articles: 'Vpered, k novym trudovym pobadam!', *Slava Sevastopolia* (6 November 1948), p. 1; 'V plenum Sevastopol'skogo gorodskogo komiteta VKP(b)', *Slava Sevastopolia* (17 November 1948), p. 1; 'Vse vnimanie stroitel'ei blagoustroistvu shkol FZO', *Slava Sevastopolia*, (19 November 1948), p. 1.

²⁶ Four letters have been preserved in the central archives noting the reservations of various groups (RGAE, f. 9432, op. 1, d. 154, ll. 263-68). Workers at the State Khersones Museum, the archeological museum for 2500-year-old Greek ruins, would obviously be concerned with tradition and preservation.

²⁷ The Directorate for the Reconstruction of Sevastopol SSSR discussed the issue in 1949. See RGAE f. 9432, op. 1, d. 387, ll. 330-335.

²⁸ GAGS f. R-308, op. 1, d. 107, ll. 16-18; GAGS f. R-79, op. 2, d. 221, l. 26; GARF f. A-259, op. 6, d. 6563, l. 4. This type of local knowledge informing the center was not limited to peripheral cities. As Steve Bittner has shown, even at the heart of power in Moscow, residents pressed for greater attention to their desires. Stephen Bittner, *The Many Lives of Khrushchev's Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow's Arbat* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2008).

²⁹ A sampling of approaches can be found in George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991); Jay Winter and Sivan Emmanuel, eds., *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999); Rudy Koshar, *German Travel Cultures* (New York, Berg, 2000); Koshar, "What Ought to be Seen": Tourists' Guidebooks and National

maintained a focus on the city's military history, but throughout the second half of the twentieth century the relative weight given to the Crimean War, the October Revolution and Civil War, and World War II shifted. In the act of writing, guidebook authors in the post-war decades have perpetuated a connection between city and fleet as they have led Sevastopol's visitors and residents through an understanding of the city. Guidebooks, whether Soviet or post-Soviet, have stressed the city's naval heritage and continued the identification of Sevastopol with heroism. Through omission and excision, guidebooks reinforced the process of forgetting discredited leaders, but they also actively created a selective 'remembering' of the past. In addressing the Turkish Wars and the Crimean War, authors across the decades remained consistent in the types of sites they highlighted and the language they used to describe the themes of heroism and sacrifice. However, coverage of the revolutionary period and World War II varied dramatically among guidebooks. Each shift in presentation helped to redefine the relative importance of military, Party, and the 'Russian masses' in Sevastopol's history.

Soviet travel guidebooks were another medium for transmitting an official image of the city to readers throughout the USSR and reinforced the identifications set in stone by Iurii Trautman. Guidebooks instructed readers where to look and how to interpret what they saw and how it fit into a larger urban and national biography. Because World War II destruction and dislocation—physical, psychological, and ideological—was of the highest magnitude in cities like Sevastopol and Stalingrad, it was imperative in the post-war decade to rebuild not only structures but also ties that bound state and society. The regime's legitimacy and power had been questioned during the war, and it was imperative that new identifications be (re)constructed to restore allegiance. The rebuilding process restored the necessities of life, but monuments, toponyms, and the travel guidebooks that discussed them also reoriented people's thinking about a city's place within the Soviet world.³⁰ Although much of the post-war architectural style varied little from one urban area to the next, guidebooks clearly delineated a unique history and contribution for each city.³¹ This was a paradoxical attempt to re-impose authority by celebrating uniqueness. For Sevastopol, this also meant disaggregating the city's naval character from the image of Crimea as a peninsula of pleasure and resorts and thereby giving residents a special role.³² The 'individuality' of a given city supported and complemented the greater Soviet identification and helped to re-establish authority and traditional culture. While some cities, like Magnitogorsk, had primarily an economic identity, others, like Novgorod, based their myth primarily on their heritage. Whether as a centre of mining and metallurgy or of ancient Russian culture, each city served as a component of the larger Soviet whole. Thus city residents could

Identities in Modern Germany and Europe', *Journal of Contemporary History* 33/3 (1998), pp. 323-340; Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane P. Koenker (eds.), *Turizm: The Russian and East European Tourist under Capitalism and Socialism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

³⁰ Iuliia Kosenkova, *Sovetskii gorod 1940-kh-pervoi poloviny 1950-kh godov: ot tvorcheskikh poiskov k praktike stroitel'stvo* (Moscow, URSS, 2000); Karl D. Qualls, 'Local-Outsider Negotiations in Sevastopol's Postwar Reconstruction, 1944-53,' in Donald J. Raleigh (ed.), *Provincial Landscapes: The Local Dimensions of Soviet Power*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), pp. 276-98.

³¹ In addition to the books under investigation here, the author has found strong similarities in Smolensk and Novgorod. For example, see *Novgorod: putevoditel'* (Leningrad, 1966); I. A. Zaitsev and I. I. Kushnir, *Ulitsy Novgoroda: spravochnik* (Leningrad, 1975); I. Belogortsev and I. Sofinskii, *Smolensk* (Moscow, 1952); and *Smolensk: spravochnik-putevoditel'* (Smolensk, 1960).

³² Susan Layton, 'Russian Military Tourism: The Crisis of the Crimean War Period,' in Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane P. Koenker (eds.), *Turizm: The Russian and East European Tourist under Capitalism and Socialism* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 43-63 shows Crimea as part of the 'pleasure periphery' in nineteenth-century military tourism.

celebrate the unique and special role of their locale while still supporting central Soviet ideals of labour and culture.

Guidebooks provided readers with the ‘correct’ understanding of the city’s past and its role in Russian and Soviet history. Like guidebooks everywhere, they prescribed and proscribed meaning when authors decided what merited attention and provided context for the sites to be explored. As time passed and new generations were born with no first-hand knowledge of war, it was important to transmit the mythic images of Sevastopol’s past to residents and visitors alike. As the Soviet Union collapsed and opportunities for tourism increased, subtle shifts occurred in the prioritization and presentation of the past in guidebooks, but they remained one of the chief media for introducing and explaining the importance of Sevastopol’s place names and 2000 memorials.

Wartime propaganda and post-war reconstruction had built on pre-revolutionary images of the city. Leo Tolstoy’s famous Crimean War sketches, *Sevastopol Tales*, provided generations of readers with a portrayal of the hero-city:

The chief thing is the happy conviction that you carry away with you—the conviction that Sevastopol cannot be taken, and not only that it cannot be taken, but that it is impossible to shake the spirit of the Russian people anywhere—and you have seen this impossibility not in the numerous traverses of breastworks, and winding trenches, mines, and guns piled one upon the other without rhyme or reason, as it seemed to you, but in the eyes, the speech, the mannerisms, and in what is termed the spirit of the defenders of Sevastopol.³³

People, not military preparations, counted most. Here Tolstoy established the equation that a battle for Sevastopol was a battle for Russia. He also marginalized the importance of political and military leaders and instead focused on the everyday heroes who would become examples to future generations. For Tolstoy, heroic examples could be effective in catalyzing similar behaviour in others. Tolstoy was somewhat derivative because the city’s first monument, erected in 1839 to honour Captain A.I. Kazarskii’s miraculous defeat of the Turkish fleet ten years earlier, states eloquently and simply on its pedestal that his feats were “An Example for Posterity.” Learning from the past was nothing new in Sevastopol.

Tolstoy’s image of a city and population at war has resonated for over a century. An 1857 travel guide noted that the ‘subject and source of inquisitiveness of visitors in Sevastopol is its defence [during the Crimean War].’³⁴ The tragic and heroic military past assumed centre stage instead of the beautiful bays and beaches of the city. As World War II raged, newspapers carried stories of the new heroes and linked them to the heroes of a century earlier. Newly arrived sailors and builders came into contact with lectures, newspaper articles, and short films on local history, such as the Crimean War, that appeared as soon as the Red Army retook the city in May 1944.³⁵ Long-term residents wanted the restoration of the familiar environment and, in order to stabilize the workforce, new residents had to be convinced that the city, with its special role within Russian and Soviet history, was worth sacrificing for. And children’s school lessons on history, literature, culture, and even science derived first from local examples.³⁶

³³ Lev Tolstoy, *Sevastopol Tales* (Moscow, Progress, 1982), p. 34.

³⁴ D. Afanas’ev, *Putevoditel’ po Sevastopol’iu* (Nikolaev, 1857), 1. See also A. N. Popov, *Pervaia uchebnaia ekskursiia simferopol’skoi muzhskoi gimnazii: Sevastopol’* (Simferopol, 1889); and Anna Petrovna (Munt) Valueva, *Sevastopol’ i ego slavnoe proshloe*, (St. Petersburg, 1904).

³⁵ ‘Segodnia,’ *Krasnyi Chernomorets*, 21 February 1945, 4.

³⁶ GAGS f. R-79, op. 2, d. 63, ll. 64-65ob.

Guidebooks after the Second World War emphasized sacrifice, teamwork, unity and fighting against great odds much as the WW II newspapers and newsreels had.³⁷ For example, in 1829 Captain Aleksandr Kazarskii decided to blow up his ship's magazine rather than surrender to two Turkish battleships. Guidebook author Zakhar Chebaniuk, writing in the 1950s, reminded his readers that 'in an uneven fight an 18-gun Russian brig won a victory over an enemy that had more than a tenfold superiority in artillery.'³⁸ Emiliia Doronina, writing two decades later, called Kazarskii's feat an 'example of fortitude to the warriors of the two defences,' which the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was continuing.³⁹ Doronina consciously connected her readers not only to the past, but showed the continuity of behaviour from Kazarskii to the present. A 2001 guidebook noted that the inscription 'An example for posterity' on Kazarskii's pedestal came from Tsar Nicholas I, an admission unthinkable in Soviet times.⁴⁰ Moreover, Kazarskii now represented a democratic choice because the city's first monument was 'dedicated not to an emperor or an admiral, but to a captain-lieutenant!'⁴¹

The representation of Kazarskii in these three books and periods underscores some of the changing dynamics in the post-war decades. Chebaniuk presented Kazarskii as a hero who was willing to die, but who instead succeeded in an unequal fight. Doronina, on the other hand, felt obligated to explain to her readers that Kazarskii served as an inspiration to all those who came after him. The post-Soviet texts not only attributed the veneration of Kazarskii to a tsar, but they also returned to the image of the everyday hero in Sevastopol in which an officer of average rank could become the first symbol of the city. This was a clear echo of Tolstoy's lessons in *Sevastopol Tales*.

Together with Kazarskii, the Crimean War stands at the centre of guidebooks' attention. The gates of Malakhov Kurgan appeared on the cover of Chebaniuk's 1955 text. The hill's Crimean War complex remained 'one of Sevastopol's most famous places.'⁴² Doronina validated the importance of the World War II memorial space at Sapun Gora by noting that its eternal flame was lit from that at Malakhov Kurgan, thereby 'symbolizing the continuity of glorious combat traditions.'⁴³ In other words, Malakhov Kurgan and the Crimean War gave legitimacy and historical depth to World War II veneration. Doronina was telling a new generation of readers what their predecessors had learned from wartime media: World War II and the Crimean War, collectively known as the 'two great defences,' were two parts of the same whole. Out of losses came victories, and the mettle of the everyday Russian withstood the test and prevented

³⁷ For a discussion of how wartime newspapers, newsreels and more set the tone for Sevastopol's postwar biography, see Qualls, *From Ruins to Reconstruction*, chapter 1. In addition to the texts that are cited later in this chapter, see Petr Garmash, *Gorod-geroi Sevastopol: ocherk putevoditel* (Simferopol, Tavriia, 1972); Vitalii Olshevskii, *Sevastopol: spravochnik* (Simferopol, Tavriia, 1977); Vitalii Olshevskii, *Sevastopol: putevoditel* (Simferopol, Tavriia, 1981); Nikolai Orlov and Igor Gassko, *Gorod-geroi Sevastopol: fotoalbum* (Simferopol, Tavriia, 1985); Boris Rosseikin, *Sevastopol: albom* (Simferopol: Krymizdat, 1960); Boris Rosseikin and Georgii Semin, *Sevastopol: putevoditel-spravochnik* (Simferopol, Krymizdat, 1961); Boris Rosseikin, Georgii Semin, and Zakhar Chebaniuk, *Sevastopol: putevoditel-spravochnik* (Simferopol, Krymizdat, 1959).

³⁸ Chebaniuk, *Sevastopol: istoricheskie mesta i pamiatniki* (Simferopol, Krymizdat, 1957), p. 34.

³⁹ Emiliia Nikolaevna Doronina and Tamara Ivanovna Iakovleva, *Pamiatniki Sevastopolia* (Simferopol, Tavriia, 1978), pp. 22–24.

⁴⁰ Alexander Dobry and Irina Borisova, *Welcome to Sevastopol*, (Simferopol, Tavriia, 2000), p. 74. The Russian edition is A. Dobry, *Dobro pozhalovat' v Sevastopol'* (Simferopol, Tavriia, 2000).

⁴¹ V. Khapaev and M. Zolotarev, *Legendarnyi Sevastopol': uglekatel'nyi putevoditel'* (Sevastopol, Fuji-Krym, 2002), 102.

⁴² Khapaev and Zolotarev, *Legendarnyi Sevastopol'*, p. 126.

⁴³ Doronina and Iakovleva, *Pamiatniki Sevastopolia*, p. 123.

the destruction of the Motherland. Doronina, by uniting the two wars symbolically, continued the trend started by wartime writers of positing a clear and direct line of succession from one generation of sailors and fighters to the next. It was as if the anthropomorphized city continued to give birth to men and women willing to sacrifice their lives to protect what they loved most: Russia. Like Kazarskii, Crimean War tales served explicitly as examples of fortitude and sacrifice against a superior force; however, the focus on heroes as examples also precluded mention of cowardice.

Unlike the Crimean War, the city's revolutionary heritage in 1905 and 1917 played a remarkably minor role in guidebooks despite the centrality of many local events to the Soviet revolutionary mythology. Chebaniuk did little more than blame 'Menshevik ringleaders,' for the failure of the 1905 Revolution.⁴⁴ Doronina, writing well after Stalin's version of history had been overturned, gave considerably more attention to the revolutionary period, but it was still quite brief in the larger scope of the book (only 23 of 143 total pages). She noted that the First Sevastopol Soviet 'endured a drubbing but the revolutionary spirit of the people remained unbroken.'⁴⁵ Thus, death was a perfectly acceptable fate when it led to greater good. In post-Soviet Ukraine, authors further marginalized the revolutionary tradition, which had lost most of its importance. Aleksandr Dobry lamented that children in 2001 knew little about the revolutionary movement. By devoting only three pages to the revolution, however, Dobry contributed further to its marginalization. Other post-Soviet authors rejected the revolutionary past entirely noting how it ushered in 'one of the most excruciating periods' of Russian history—the Soviet Union.⁴⁶ Another author went further and called the 1917 Revolution and Civil War 'A microscopic, laughable segment of time in the scale of history. ...Horrible!.. Bloody!..Destructive!'⁴⁷ He tried to minimize both the time and importance of the revolution and thereby show that it had little effect on the longer history of Sevastopol. By casting the communist period as short-lived (and not three-quarters of a century), the author also suggested that this was grossly out of character with Sevastopol's heroic image and past. In many cities this type of rescripting may have been more difficult. But because architects and other mythmakers in the 1940s and 1950s had already championed Sevastopol's Russianness over its Sovietness, a new localism that ignored or despised the Soviet period was possible without dramatic change to the cityscape.

World War II became the defining event for a new generation of Soviet citizens, and guidebooks bear this out. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Chebaniuk focused on individual heroes and thereby personalized the war for his audience. In the first days of the 1941-42 defence, Chebaniuk noted, five members of the naval infantry initiated an 'unparalleled dual' as they destroyed sixteen tanks by themselves and thus 'fulfilled their debt' as they fought to their death.⁴⁸ They were repaying the Soviet system for their upbringing. Doronina also recounted the feats of the 'five daring Black Sea sailors' and their ability to twice repel the German advance.⁴⁹ The fighters in Pillbox No. 11 similarly staged a valiant defence against all odds. Bombarded from the air and on the ground, they held out for more than three days until all but one were dead. Chebaniuk recorded the soldiers' oath, but Doronina distilled it to its three main points:

⁴⁴ Chebaniuk, *Sevastopol: istoricheskie mesta i pamiatniki*, p. 98–101.

⁴⁵ Doronina and Iakovleva, *Pamiatniki Sevastopolia*, p. 65.

⁴⁶ Khapaev and Zolotarev, *Legendarnyi Sevastopol'*, p. 42.

⁴⁷ *Sevastopol': putevoditel'* (Simferopol: Svit, 2004), p. 22.

⁴⁸ Chebaniuk, *Sevastopol: istoricheskie mesta i pamiatniki*, p. 113–14.

⁴⁹ Doronina and Iakovleva, *Pamiatniki Sevastopolia*, pp. 103–104.

‘Under no condition surrender to captivity. Fight the enemy the Black Sea way, to the last drop of blood. Be brave, masculine to the end.’ She conveniently omitted point one of the oath which repeated Stalin’s infamous directive to take ‘not one step back.’ She aided the remembrance of what she viewed as positive and heroic, but she omitted reference to Stalin and his order to shoot any Soviet soldier who tried to retreat. Doronina aided the process of forgetting fear and Stalin’s brutal repression. She also conveniently ‘forgot’ that some people did run away from the fight and had to be kept fighting by threats.

Post-Soviet authors generally omitted detailed discussion of individual heroes and instead directed readers’ attention to the larger complexes of communal remembrance such as in the Monument to Young People, the Monument to the Defenders of Sevastopol, and the Monument to the Aviators of the Black Sea Navy. Individuals from the Crimean War, however, were still honoured robustly. As the demystification of WW II heroes like partisan Zoia Kosmodemianskaia advanced in the post-Soviet period, it certainly raised questions about all individual hagiographies. In addition, without state censorship and subsidies, authors had to be selective in order to minimize the size of the texts and thereby manage profitability. Rather than laboriously cover each example of heroism, guidebook authors have opted for portraying the overall collective heroism of the defenders of WW II. The explosion of commemoration in the last-quarter century that added roughly 1300 monuments to the city landscape made comprehensive coverage impossible and likely seemed excessive for generations with no direct contact to the war.⁵⁰ Besides, as one guidebook noted: ‘one must judge that many monuments are either excessively grandiose or simplistic.’⁵¹ Thus, guidebooks more recently have decided to focus primarily on the nineteenth-century feats and monuments.

But the city of Sevastopol has not remained entirely in the past. Sevastopol today boasts several fashionable restaurants, jewellers, clothing stores, and more. Many stores promote foreign products with foreign advertising, but even modernized stores for local Russian and Ukrainian products have transformed the aesthetic of the urban environment. However, some commercial interests in the city embraced the Russian past. Advertisers have learned to target local consumers by associating their products with the city’s past. A restaurant name Traktir is named for the 1855 Crimean War battle that attempted to remove the French from the city, and the interior is covered with paintings on nautical and military themes. The meat products firm KAMO placed billboards around the city stating that ‘There are Sausages. And there are KAMO Sausages.’ The background to this unimaginative slogan was the Monument to Scuttled Ships, the most beloved monument in the entire city, which honours the intentional scuttling of ships at the mouth of the main bay in order to prevent enemy ships from entering during the Crimean War. Photos of the monument are ubiquitous in calendars, on postcards, and the covers of many city guidebooks and histories. It is *the* symbol of the city. In short, such advertisers draw not only on the city’s Russian past but also on residents’ sense of local identification. The intent is to associate KAMO with the city and create modern brand loyalty. As Sevastopol adapts to the world of capitalism, its image as a stalwart defender of the Motherland is strengthened through advertising and marketing of its past, but it is also diluted through the multiple images that city leaders and entrepreneurs are now projecting about leisure and ethnic tourism.

⁵⁰ In 1978 Doronina counted 739 total monuments and in 1999 there were 2015 monuments registered with the city. See Doronina and Iakovleva, *Pamiatniki Sevastopolia*, p. 3; Dobry and Borisova, *Welcome to Sevastopol*, p. 46.

⁵¹ *Sevastopol’: putevoditel’*, p. 37.

Sevastopol and the countries of which it has been a part have seen dramatic changes: multiple regime changes, the Cold War and its demise, becoming a city in independent Ukraine, and now at the time of writing in April 2014 in limbo, part of Ukraine but also annexed by Russia. Throughout, however, Sevastopol has maintained the image so consciously created in the wake of war because it had already subjugated the revolution to war exploits in the middle of the last two centuries. During the war and post-war decade, mythmakers and urban planners alike worked hard to (re)fashion and keep alive the myth of Sevastopol as a bastion defending the Russian Motherland.⁵²

Although it might appear to be counterintuitive, local identification was one strategy of re-imposing central authority after WW II. Disoriented and homeless citizens needed somewhere to root themselves after a traumatic era. In a city like Sevastopol that almost ceased to exist after the Second World War, many of the people who inhabited the rubble after liberation and rebuilt the city came from elsewhere. In order to mobilize, settle, and motivate the new labour force for reconstruction, various strategies of local identification became common.

As long as an urban biography promoted the city in concert with the Russian/Soviet state, then the process of local identification posed little threat to the central regime. With the Soviet Union forming a Russocentric identification in the 1930s, Sevastopol was free to reach back to its nineteenth-century Russian heritage to construct a mythology that trumped even the Bolshevik Revolution. The construction of an urban biography was both a reflection of and catalyst for local identification. Authors, artists, architects and other creators of urban biographies did not start from a tabula rasa; they selectively remembered the past and transformed it to meet contemporary conditions and to promote their own values and beliefs or those of their patrons. Urban identification was manufactured for travellers, but also for new arrivals needing to learn what it means to be 'local.' Guidebooks told visitors and residents alike what they should understand about monuments and the names of squares and streets fashioned by post-war urban planners.

Sevastopol shared many of the same problems of physical reconstruction with other destroyed former Soviet Bloc cities, but it is likely a unique case of a city outside Russia that benefited from the turn to Russocentrism during the Stalin years. Today, one can see the attachment to the city's past in both its built space and its residents' understandings of self and place. Soviet Russocentrism and a revival of localism after World War II created a Ukrainian city that today still views itself as Russian and in March 2014 voted overwhelmingly to rejoin Russia. Monuments, street names, and a particular neo-classical building style constructed a unique image for the city. Guidebooks were one medium to perpetuate the image constructed during the post-war decade and came to pose a challenge for post-Soviet Ukraine, which, in 1991, assumed control of a city with a biography and demography that are overwhelmingly Russian. The agents of identification in Sevastopol created a relational web with the city and its population serving as defenders of the Russian Motherland. This means that much of Sevastopol's perceived place in the world was connected to Russia and the USSR. As one of the first designated hero-cities, Sevastopol carried a categorical identification shared initially only with Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Odessa. Because the categorical, but especially the relational, mode of identification tied Sevastopol to Russia, the city's incorporation into the post-Soviet independent state of Ukraine has been fraught with challenges, but the city's Russian identification remains mostly unchanged.⁵³

⁵² Qualls, *From Ruins to Reconstruction*, chapter 4.

⁵³ For more on relational and categorical identification, see Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, 'Beyond

Although near total destruction during the war made radical replanning possible, locals argued that maintaining past traditions was essential to the stability and happiness of the population in a vital military city. Since Sevastopol's history focused on military sacrifice in defence of the Motherland, the new localized vision for Sevastopol complemented rather than competed with larger Soviet objectives. The irony is that local officials had to fend off central attempts to change the city's built space and sites of memory and in the process they created a stronger link with the centre.

The resilience of the post-war decade's localization project, embedded in built space and rehearsed in classrooms, tourist guides and festivals for decades, is now the source of tension with the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv. When Sevastopol's citizens took to the streets in March 2014 to demand and then celebrate annexation by Russia, it was not only a response to the perceived threat of losing the right to speak Russian or the hope for higher pensions and wages. Rather, many were motivated by a long held and continuous historical connection, manifested in built space, to Russia and its military history.

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