Traveling Today through Sevastopol's Past: Postcommunist Continuity in a "Ukrainian" Cityscape

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Walking along Soviet Street on the high central hill in Sevastopol, the visitor confronts spray-painted graffiti on the yellowed wall of a building that reads: “Sevastopol is Russia.” While graffiti is a common form of self-expression in most cities, it is also a political statement in this Ukrainian port city that would likely choose the leadership of Moscow over Kyiv. The uninitiated viewer would likely also be confused by the persistence of the name “Soviet Street,” which leads to a large statue of Vladimir Lenin that towers over the city. Cities throughout Eastern Europe are now Westernizing by erecting glass-and-steel skyscrapers while also destroying remnants...
of the past by tearing down buildings and statues and renaming streets and squares. Are Sevastopol’s residents and city leaders stuck in the communist past, or is there another way to explain this Russian-minded enclave so many years after the fall of the Soviet Union? Why has Sevastopol changed so little and shown less of a concern with creating new, local identity as part of a European community?

On the basis of interviews, a review of the press, a decade of personal observations, and previous research, this chapter seeks to explain how a predominantly Russian city within Ukraine is fighting the trend to integrate into Europe. As the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections showed, Sevastopol, like much of Eastern and Southern Ukraine, identifies more with Moscow than Kyiv. Unlike many cities in Eastern Europe, Sevastopol has seen virtually no renaming of streets and squares to signal its status as part of an independent Ukraine. Likewise, the configuration of new sites of identification with Ukraine is rare. The obligatory statue to Ukraine’s greatest literary icon—Taras Shevchenko—is the single exception. Aside from the commercialization of ground-floor storefronts on the central ring road and new dachas on the outskirts, one would notice little change in the cityscape over the last decade.

This chapter shows that this relative continuity in Sevastopol’s built environment is the result of a well-defined, long-lasting local identity developed both before and after World War II. Moreover, this identity was easily adapted to the post-Soviet transformation and thus mitigated the need to redefine the city, as has been so common elsewhere. This local identity transcended the Soviet Union and continues to frustrate attempts to develop a Ukrainian identity. Because the Russian Black Sea Fleet is still based in the city and most of the sites of memory created in the twentieth century highlight the contribution of Russians, political affinities tend toward Moscow rather than Kyiv. Whereas other Eastern European cities have seen great transformation, none shared Sevastopol’s demographic makeup or maintained as strong a connection to their pre-Soviet roots throughout the twentieth century.

The Importance and Persistence of the Past in Sevastopol

Any political entity bent on reshaping the identity of Sevastopol over the short term has a Herculean task ahead. For over two hundred years, Sevastopol has been first and foremost a Russian naval city. However, when
Catherine the Great founded the city in 1784 as an outpost against the Turks, she built upon the foundation of earlier inhabitants. The ancient Greeks founded the city of Chersonesus (Khersones to Slavs) 2,500 years ago on land that is now part of greater Sevastopol. Whether Greeks, Turks, or East Slavs, all the powers who held sway in the city realized the commercial and military potential of this spot at the southern tip of the Crimean Peninsula with its deep and numerous bays and heights at the perimeter of the city. Sevastopol and its surroundings played a vital role in defending Russia in the Turkish Wars, in the Crimean War, and in World War II.

One site of memory—the Monument to Scuttled Ships—stands at the center of Sevastopol’s identity as a naval bastion. Because of the difficulty of attacking from land, British and French forces during the Crimean War tried to move into the bays, which would have put the city center within range of their guns. To prevent what would have resulted in immediate capitulation, the Russian Navy chose to sink some of its own ships at the mouth of the bay to prevent the enemy from entering. This sacrificial act became a defining event for the city; and in World War II soldiers, sailors, and citizens threw themselves under tanks, charged machine gun nests, and threw bombs off burning ships in emulation of the previous century’s sacrifice.¹

Despite the “two great defenses” (as the Crimean War and World War II are known in Sevastopol), much of the city’s projected character and identity have been derived from its first monument, which honors the brig Mercury and its commander, Aleksandr Kazarskii. In May 1829, Kazarskii and his crew on the Mercury found themselves facing Turkish ships with ten times the number of guns. Rather than flee, Kazarskii skillfully maneuvered his lone ship and harassed the Turkish fleet into retreat. The first of Sevastopol’s over two thousand monuments honored this courageous and creative victory. The inscription on the pedestal has become a mantra for the city: “An Example for Posterity.” Kazarskii’s victory against all odds inspired the Russian forces facing the British, French, Turks, and Sardinians in the Crimean War. Likewise, in World War II, German, Rumanian, and Italian forces initially had a greater quantity and quality of troops and technology in their successful assault on the city. For two years, the residents who were unable to flee the city lived under Nazi occupation. However, an underground movement immediately developed and helped the Red Army recapture the city in May 1944. For over a century, the city’s life was devoted to war, to preparations for war, or to reconstruction after destruction, often against great odds.

Although Soviet officials wanted to highlight the city’s revolutionary history, post–World War II narratives of the city clearly placed the revolu-
tions and Civil War behind the importance of the “two great defenses.” Since the end of World War II, residents and nonresidents alike have been bombarded with a set of images that help to define the city’s identity and role in Russian and Soviet history, often in conflict with Europe. Even as World War II raged, newspapers carried stories of the new heroes and linked them to the heroes of a century earlier. Newspapers today continue the tradition of recalling the “two great defenses” for audiences far removed from the events.

Reminders of the Russian naval past are inescapable for residents and visitors. Before World War II, Sevastopol had already started to become an open-air museum of monuments, memorials, and plaques, and the war catalyzed a resurgence of mythmaking during the second half of the twentieth century, which has led to roughly 2,015 monuments today. Though Moscow-based planners wanted to turn the city into a museum to Soviet power and the victory in World War II, local officials diverged from these plans to encompass the city’s larger heritage. When the local architectural team rebuilt the city, which had been 97 percent destroyed, they emphasized its naval heritage and especially its role in the Crimean War. For example, the Moscow planners had proposed relocating the beautiful but destroyed panorama and museum to the Crimean War off of Historical Boulevard to highlight the most recent victory. Local planners successfully argued that the Crimean War should not be marginalized, but rather it should remain figuratively and geographically at the heart of the city as a key facet of its identity and landscape.

After World War II, renamed streets, parks, and squares highlighted Sevastopol’s nineteenth-century legacy and lent continuity to its identity. Wherever one turned, residents and visitors were reminded of the city’s ongoing struggle against European attacks. The city’s place in Russian and Soviet history, its relationship to the ruling Soviet ideology, and the place of ethnic minorities all found expression in the changing urban fabric. In some cases, the Soviet present came to the fore, as when city officials renamed Catherine the Great Street in favor of Lenin Street following the Revolution. Although many post-Soviet cities have removed all traces of the Bolsheviks, Sevastopol retains Sovietized street names and Lenin’s statue still looks down over the city from the central hill. In fact, Sevastopol’s central district is still called “Leninskii.”

The postrevolutionary period also saw the creation of Karl Marx and Mikhail Frunze streets as the other two main conduits around the central hill. Thus, the father of the Revolution (Lenin), the creator of its ideology
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(Marx), and the liberator of Crimea during the Civil War (Frunze) all become a part of one's daily life walking about the city center. However, unlike Lenin Street, Marx Street and Frunze Street disappeared as toponyms in the years after World War II. In reverting to the prerevolutionary names Bol'shaia Morskaia (Big Naval) Street and Admiral Nakhimov Prospect, urban planners indicated a preference for historical figures related to local, rather than Soviet, identity. These figures provide residents points of historical reference for developing national and local pride not related to the propagation of Socialist values. Marx had no direct link to Sevastopol, and few considered Frunze a "local" hero despite his role in "liberating" Sevastopol from the Germans in the early 1920s. In contrast, Admiral P. S. Nakhimov was first among the local heroes of the Crimean War, and Bol'shaia Morskaia could express the city's character as a naval port, unlike Marx or Lenin.

For similar reasons, after World War II planners gave new names to the squares marking the intersections of Sevastopol's chief ring roads. The Square of the Third International became first Parade Square and then Nakhimov Square. Novoselskaia became Commune Square after the Revolution but took the name of Admiral Ushakov during reconstruction. Even Revolutionary Square disappeared in favor of the eighteenth-century commander of the fleet, M. P. Lazarev. The preeminent role of the navy, the presence of naval representatives on review boards, and a cooperative civilian leadership conspired to make Sevastopol a city steeped in its prerevolutionary naval tradition. By linking this history to the events of World War II Sevastopol's citizens and sailors could claim a long and glorious tradition of defending the Motherland. One could view these name changes as an abandonment of Socialist goals, but like the refashioning of local histories and aesthetics in Eastern Europe today, it was more important to the city's stability and rapid reconstruction to resurrect a unique local character to which residents could attach their ideals and aspirations. Moreover, the virtues associated with the defense of the city during the Crimean War seemed to be mirrored in the Soviet values of duty, sacrifice, and fighting against all odds for the Motherland. Therefore, such an emphasis on local identity did not necessarily undermine the patriotic facets of a Soviet identity, but in fact complemented them. Because architects and planners had created the city as specifically Soviet after World War II but rather also relied on its prerevolutionary Russian heritage, its transformation after 1991 was less traumatic and dramatic than in those cities that had had their pre-Soviet history expunged during the twentieth century. Postwar urban plan-
ners had already placed the city’s nineteenth-century heritage ahead of the Soviet revolutionary tradition. Therefore, with the collapse of the USSR, Sevastopol could easily revert to its Russian orientation, although the definition of “Motherland” would now be open to interpretation.

Toponyms amid the rubble of the city marked it as an ethnically and culturally homogenous Russian/Slavic city and ignored its more heterogeneous past. The architectural footprint left by the two non- Slavic, non-European groups in the city disappeared in the war and its aftermath. The Soviet regime deported Crimean Tatars en masse for alleged collaboration with the Nazis, and Crimean Karaite Jews suffered like most European Jews under Hitler. With the decimation of these populations came the destruction of their places of worship. The postwar planners ignored this multiethnic heritage in reconstructing the city and in refashioning its image. Eliminating the remnants of “collaborators” and “anti-Soviet cosmopolitans” (the catchphrase for Jews) became paramount in an era marked by further paranoia about “enemies” and growing anti-Semitism after the establishment of Israel. The Kenasa, a Karaite prayer hall on Bol’shaia Morskaia, became the Spartak Sports Club; the Tatar mosque just two streets off the ring road became the naval archive after workers removed the minarets and “erased” Koranic inscriptions on the building’s facade.

In that city purged of its cultural diversity, designers also set about unifying the architectural style that had been an eclectic blend of nineteenth-century neoclassical, constructivist, and early Stalinist functionalist buildings. Late Stalinist architecture, marked in most people’s minds by “wedding cake” buildings with highly decorative facades, found no place in Sevastopol. Instead, designers turned to an aspect of Sevastopol’s architectural heritage, the partially preserved Greek ruins of the Khersones Archaeological Preserve. Recognizing these architectural remains as a local prototype allowed architects to preserve and restore some of the city’s best neoclassical (and often religious) architecture, such as the 1844 Parthenon-like Saints Peter and Paul Cathedral, which otherwise might have fallen victim to the official policy of promoting atheism.

In addition to the neoclassical style, architects included balconies and loggias on nearly all their buildings to take advantage of the seaside character of the city. Likewise, most buildings were finished with stucco and painted ochre to contrast with the blue-black sea and to take advantage of the bright sunlight. Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian columns, massive pediments, and geometric precision defined new buildings after the war. But unlike Moscow, where architects applied historic styles to tall high-rises, all
new construction in the historic center of Sevastopol was limited to three to five stories. Architects argued for this limitation on aesthetic grounds, but the great 1948 earthquake in Ashkhabad/Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, revealed that Sevastopol’s seismic activity would not permit greater vertical construction. The elimination of culturally diverse elements, the accommodation to the climatic and topographical peculiarities of the site, the choice of a local architectural prototype, and a limitation on the height of construction lent the city a unique and homogenous character.

The consistent Russian character of the city would seem to be projected through neoclassical facades that recalled the 2,500-year-old ruins of the ancient Greek city at nearby Khersones. This historical appropriation of an architectural style is symptomatic of the local invention of tradition and the promulgation of a selective history. Planners designed Sevastopol envisioning its role within the Soviet Union, lending it a unified appearance that helped project a unified history.

Post-Soviet Ukrainianization and Resulting Tensions

After the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of an independent Ukraine, the overwhelmingly Russian-speaking population of Sevastopol wondered what would become of them, of the city’s “Russianness,” and of its privileged position vis-à-vis the state of which it had been a part. Sevastopol also had enjoyed a special status as a “city of republic subordination.” Simply put, the city had much more autonomy and a direct relationship with the Soviet capital that often bypassed the regional governments. Because of its military importance, it was better provisioned than other Crimean cities and most other Ukrainian cities as well. Many wondered if an independent Ukraine would continue to support Sevastopol in the same manner as the Soviet Union. Moreover, as Ukraine started dialogue with NATO and the European Union, Russian naval personnel and the pro-Russian population that shared Moscow’s disdain for these links to Europe saw their worldview challenged. This situation played itself out in national, regional, and local politics.

When Iurii Meshkov won the presidency of the Crimean Autonomous Republic in January 1994 and came into office with a pro-separatist Parliament, he tried to make good on his promises to reunite the nation with Russia, and Sevastopol’s City Council supported this by declaring the city Russian territory. But when Meshkov pulled back from pre-election promises
to appoint pro-Moscow Crimeans to key posts and instead appointed Muscovites, Parliament voted to curb his powers, which in turn led him to disband Parliament. With a Parliament-appointed prime minister, Crimea in essence had two governments, neither of which functioned. On March 17, 1995, the Ukrainian Parliament, backed by President Leonid Kuchma, eliminated the presidency of Crimea and revoked its Constitution. Thus, Meshkov was left without power or a position. Kuchma sent Interior Ministry troops into the Crimean capital of Simferopol, and they disarmed Meshkov’s entourage. Russia, which immediately after the Soviet collapse protested that Sevastopol was still Russian territory, could undertake little while still waging war with secessionists in Chechnya.  

Two years later, President Kuchma demanded that Crimea change to the same time zone as Kiev, not Moscow. With the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine in 1997, Russia agreed to recognize Ukraine’s territorial boundaries, including Crimea. Thus Crimea and Sevastopol lost their special status even while an internal battle in the Crimean government continued concerning the relationship to Russia and Ukraine.

The most important aspect of this conflict for Sevastopol was the question about the disposition of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. When in 1995 Russian president Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian president Kuchma divided the former Soviet fleet, it seemed to promise an end to one of the most persistent and potentially violent disputes between the two countries. Since 1991, the former Soviet fleet had flown the flags of both countries, but commanders usually followed orders from Moscow, which, after all, paid most salaries. As the Crimean government fought to secede from Ukraine, the issue of the fleet became a powder keg. Bloody fights between Ukrainian and Russian sailors ensued and only declined in number after 1995 when Russia received 82 percent of the fleet and agreed to lease Sevastopol’s naval facilities. Furthermore, NATO exercises in the Black Sea enraged many Russians, who saw it as a provocation and an attempt to woo Ukraine away from its Slavic brother.

For four years, the sailors of the two fleets had looked at each other with contempt, suspicion, and animosity. They blamed each other’s governments for poor maintenance and inadequate funding and for harboring nationalist pretensions. In one famous incident, Ukrainian commandos stormed a Russian naval base in Odessa and arrested three officers; the Russian authorities claimed that even the officers’ children were beaten. Ukraine claimed it was retaliating for the theft of $10 million in navigation equip-
ment aboard the Sevastopol-based ship Chekelen. When two Ukrainian ships tried to intercept the Chekelen, the Russian Navy sent an attack group from Sevastopol that chased the Ukrainian ships away. Ensuing Ukrainian seizures of former Soviet bases led Moscow to place its warships on full alert.\textsuperscript{20}

When the number of Russian sailors quickly increased in the 1990s, the navy started appropriating parts of the city near the port for dacha-style housing, thus establishing a “home” for the navy and not merely a military posting.\textsuperscript{21} This heightened animosity with Ukraine. In 1997 Moscow mayor Iurii Luzhkov increased tensions by financing and building an apartment building for Russian sailors in Sevastopol, something that met with the approval of the local Russian population. One resident noted that “Luzhkov is right. Sevastopol is a historic military city of Russia. All its major events and achievements are important chapters in Russian history.”\textsuperscript{22} One and a half years later, the mayor of Moscow continued to insist that “Crimea must be returned to Russia.”\textsuperscript{23} Rear Admiral Vadim Vasyukov appeared on a Moscow television program and noted that it is “hard to overestimate the contribution of the Moscow municipal government and Iurii Mikhailovich Luzhkov personally” to the work of the Black Sea Fleet.\textsuperscript{24} Luzhkov fortified the Russian presence in the city by signing an agreement to aid Sevastopol in economic, cultural, and technical matters through 2005.\textsuperscript{25} The strong Russian presence that still prevails both demographically and politically has worked toward keeping the physical character of the city relatively unchanged. Sevastopol’s close identification with Russia has led it to turn away from Europe even as Ukraine tries to position itself for NATO and European Union membership against the wishes of Russia.

This raises the question about whether or not Kyiv will try to “Ukrainianize” post-Soviet Sevastopol, just as local Soviet officials had “Russianized” it after World War II. At the beginning of the new millennium, with the Crimean Parliament under their control and the questions of boundaries and the fleet resolved, Ukrainian authorities erected a statue to the Ukrainian literary hero Taras Shevchenko in front of the Gagarin regional administration building. Local citizens, the overwhelming majority of whom do not speak Ukrainian, did not appreciate a monument dedicated to the Ukrainian national poet, who had no connection to the city. When asked, some residents of the city explained that this lack of appreciation did not derive from Russophilia or Ukrainophobia. After all, they fully accepted monuments to Ukrainians, Armenians, Georgians, and any other non-Russians who had fought and often died defending the city. What they resent, they
say, is seeing local military heroes standing alongside the revered Ukrainian artist meant to symbolize the claims of the Ukrainian nation.

The Shevchenko statue remains the only clear symbol of the Ukrainianization in the city, although Ukrainian place names are not uncommon. For example, in 2004 twenty streets carried a distinctly Ukrainian surname. Of those twenty, nine were named for heroes of World War II, four for participants in the Civil War, and two each for the Crimean War and the 1905 rising in the city. In short, seventeen of the twenty street names honored service to the city and country, not nationality. All twenty streets were named up to the mid-1960s, except one—Taras Shevchenko Street (1987). Sevastopol’s Encyclopedia discusses each of the namesakes of these streets, and Taras Shevchenko’s entry is clearly the briefest at seven lines; Ignatii Shevchenko (a prominent figure from the Crimean War) earned thirty-seven! In fact, the Encyclopedia’s biography of Taras Shevchenko—“(1814–1861) great Ukrainian poet, artist, thinker, revolutionary democrat”—is shorter than its description of the street’s location. No renaming of streets occurred after Ukrainian Independence.

Much like the patterns of name giving, the patterns of historic preservation in Sevastopol suggest a deeper connection to Russia while eschewing at least part of the Soviet past. As in other cities around the Soviet Union during the 1920s and 1930s, places of worship in Sevastopol were torn down or given new functions. The end of the Soviet Union opened the possibility of national revival through religious revival. In the years since the Soviet collapse, the Municipality of Sevastopol has started to restore part of this Orthodox heritage. Four key churches dot Sevastopol’s landscape and help to define the city in different ways. The Pokrovskii Cathedral (1905; architect, V. A. Fel’dman) on Bol’shaia Morskaia suffered severe damage in World War II, but was restored by 1950. For the next nine years, it hosted services, but from 1959 to 1969 it housed a sports hall and the city archive. From 1969 to 1994, the municipal archive took possession of the entire complex. Since 1994, the church has been reopened for religious services, despite ongoing restoration. With its Byzantine style and setting among trendy shops and restaurants at the very heart of the city, this Russian Orthodox church presents one clear token of the religious revival.

Sevastopol also has retained its two Saint Vladimir cathedrals. One sits atop the central hill, and the other stands in the Khersones Archaeological Preserve, where it marks the supposed spot of Vladimir the Great’s baptism in 988. Designed in 1842 and initially intended for Khersones, Saint Vladi-
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mir Cathedral was instead constructed on the central hill (1848–88) because the fleet commander demanded that the church be built close to naval headquarters. Behind the imposing facade of this edifice lie the tombs of the admirals Lazarev, Nakhimov, Kornilov, and Istomin, and thirteen other heroes of the Crimean War. During the Nazi siege of the city, the cathedral suffered heavy damage. Only in 1966, after residents bitterly contested plans to raze the building and move the crypts of the naval heroes, were the authorities moved to restore the cathedral. In 1972 the building housed the Museum of the Heroic Defense and Liberation of Sevastopol, but in October 1991 it was again returned to the church. Restoration work continues. This church symbolizes more than the revival of religion; it embodies the sacrifice of war. Large plaques on its facade remind visitors of the Crimean War heroes, and the remaining shell damage recalls World War II, thus allowing the building to commemorate both wars.

Saint Vladimir Cathedral at Khersones, rededicated in 2001 with the Russian and Ukrainian presidents Vladimir Putin and Leonid Kuchma in attendance, once again dominates the skyline of the architectural preserve. Erected in 1891 by D. I. Grimm on the spot where Vladimir the Great is said to have adopted the Byzantine faith and thus brought Christianity to the Kievan Rus’, the cathedral functioned for only twenty-three years before the Soviet government closed it. Nazi bombing and local looting of stone rubble for housing left the structure in ruins after World War II. In 1992 the church reclaimed the building, and in 2004 Sevastopol’s mayor handed this magnificent structure to the Moscow Patriarchate because it is the “largest confession in the region.” The presence of Putin and Kuchma signaled the importance of the common heritage of the two states, but the control of the site by Moscow suggests that Vladimir the Great and his capital at Kyiv are more a part of Russian history than Ukrainian. This would be consistent with most Russian historiography, which traces the beginnings of the Russian state to Kyiv.

Another cathedral dedicated to Saints Peter and Paul (1839–43; architect, V. A. Rulev) stands on the previous site of a Greek church. It was destroyed during the Crimean War and rebuilt by two merchants in 1889. From the Revolution to World War II, it served as the city’s archive. In 1946 the city restored it as the Lunacharsky Drama Theater, until it became the House of Culture in 1957. Only recently has the building been returned to the
church, but no evidence of construction could be seen in 2004. Saints Peter and Paul Cathedral’s facade is clearly reminiscent of the Parthenon; again, the point of both local and limited European reference is ancient Greece.

The rebuilding of all the churches signals a return to “Russianness” both in the revival of architectural styles associated with Russia and in the revival of the institution most closely associated with a traditional Russian identity: the Russian Orthodox Church. Sevastopol is unlike other former Soviet cities such as Riga or Vilnius that have a Roman Catholic or Protestant heritage that allows them to link their local heritage and to the broader religious heritage of Western Europe. As Patriarch Alexy II of the Russian Orthodox Church has clearly stated, those other forms of Christianity are not part of the Russian religious heritage. His consistent refusal to allow Pope John Paul II to visit Moscow set a clear divide between Russia and Europe. The Russian state agreed in 1997 when it decreed that the Russian Orthodox Church was the only traditional Christian religion of Russia.

Just as religious revivalism serves as a vehicle to overcome divisions between state and society by defining a common cultural space, war remembrance added an opportunity to bring Sevastopol and Ukraine together in a common history. In 2004 Sevastopol celebrated the two-hundred-twentieth anniversary of its founding, the one-hundred-fiftieth anniversary of the Crimean War, and the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of Sevastopol (May) and Ukraine (October). Tourists, including Prince Phillip of the United Kingdom, flocked to the city to commemorate various events. Buses and trams carried signs that read “Sevastopol—220 years” and “Hero-City Sevastopol,” and banners announcing the sixtieth anniversary of the “liberation of Ukraine from the German-fascist invaders” adorned utility lines. Newspapers from the communist Sevastopolskaia pravda to the more mainstream Slava Sevastopoliia and popular Sevastopolskaia gazeta carried historical articles about the two midcentury defenses and remembrances from veterans of the latter one. Television stations also aired brief documentaries and reports on the various celebrations. Posters lined store windows, and publications on the Crimean War and World War II filled bookstore shelves. The interested buyer could even buy multilingual postcards celebrating the one-hundred-fiftieth anniversary of the Crimean War. The fold-out cards had historical images adjacent to the same scene from the present. Thus, the education of the traveler about Sevastopol’s past continues. Whereas the celebration of the Crimean War and World War II were common, only recently has Sevastopol celebrated the anniversary of Ukraine’s liberation from the Nazis in any meaningful way. In doing so, it is begin-
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traveling to blend the image of Sevastopol’s liberation with the narrative of Ukraine’s struggle.

Although tourism and celebrations have started to relate Sevastopol’s history more closely with the history of Ukraine and bring Europeans and other foreigners to the city, the local history of the city’s defense against Europeans still dominates. Tourism centered on war remembrance understandably increases in anniversary years, and even children are frequent visitors. For example, in the fifteenth season of what is described as “intellectual games,” forty-two teams of students matched wits about ancient and medieval Khersones, the Crimean War, and the region’s natural resources. More than seven hundred young students from the Donets Oblast (region) “visited historical and memorial places, [and] placed flowers at the Memorial of hero defenders of Sevastopol in 1941-1942.” The naval news program Reflection also reported on the visit of a school group from Saint Petersburg studying the city as a Russian naval outpost and as the birthplace of Orthodox Christianity for the East Slavs. Although the city is part of Ukraine, it is not yet a site of “Ukrainian” tourism, and in these examples students are learning what makes Sevastopol unique and how it is connected to Russian history and traditions.

The Commercialization of Post-Soviet Space

Although ritual space and sites of memory have remained relatively unchanged since the end of the Soviet Union, newly commercialized space has created a drastic juxtaposition between old and new. There is nothing clearly “Ukrainian” in this development, but it does seem “European.” The twenty-first century has brought commercial storefronts to the ground floors of buildings along the central ring road. Unlike the mid-1990s, Sevastopol today boasts several fashionable restaurants (and unfashionable ones, like McDonald’s), jewelers, clothing stores, and more. Many stores promote foreign products with foreign advertising, but even stores for local Russian and Ukrainian products have transformed the aesthetic of the urban environment. The contrast between old and new is clear to any observer. Though many ground-floor shops sport modern glass display windows and steel entryways with newly painted plaster facades, the upper residential floors show the wear of the years since the buildings rose out of the rubble of World War II. On the upper floors, which are primarily residential, yellowed and grayed plaster remains and ferro-concrete balconies and loggias crum-
ble. Though residents live in the old Sevastopol, tourists and wealthy residents shop in the new.

Two stores on Bol'shaia Morskaia Street, today the most fashionable shopping area of the city, show the contrast between the traditional Soviet use of built space and the new commercialization of post-Soviet space. Megasport is the largest sporting goods store in the city center. The large, heavy, Soviet-era wooden doors greet visitors as they walk beneath the English-language store sign. Brightly colored placards (also in Latin characters) promoting Reebok, Nike, Speedo, and Adidas flank the entryway down the length of the sidewalk. Two large color posters of male athletes hang on either side of the doorway with text in Ukrainian and store hours in Russian. Thus, we have a multilingual storefront promoting an all-foreign line of sporting goods. Moreover, the plaster wall facades have been painted a bright white, offsetting the color of the promotional material. Juxtaposed with the bright, colorful lower floor are the essentially untouched upper two floors. The plaster walls have grayed, and the faux balustrade immediately above the store looks particularly shabby when set off against the new white paint (figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1. The Megasport sporting goods store in 2004. Photograph by Karl D. Qualls.
On the opposite side of the street, the new women's clothing store Fete and its neighboring casino shows an even greater juxtaposition between old and new. A new arched doorway cut in the stone facade was reinforced with highly polished steel. The glass door and display window were topped by a similar glass arch. Clean, modern lines dominate the interior and exterior, but the balcony and the Doric-style balustrade that serves as a railing on the floor above are disintegrating. In one section of six balusters, five are missing. Much like Megasport, the newly painted facade sets off the new commercial floor from the older dilapidated residential floors above (figure 6.2). The casino, something strictly forbidden in the Soviet period, beckons a new generation of residents with disposable income and/or in desperate hope for a better future.

This juxtaposition of wealth and poverty is also visible in other places along this stretch of street. A wide consumer products store with a painted white facade shines below a second-floor balcony that has rotted and shows clear signs of patchwork repair. Directly above this dangerous balcony is a loggia also painted stark white, including its Ionic columns, which contrasts starkly with the neighboring apartment's unpainted and enclosed loggia (figure 6.3). Sevastopol's commercial development has created a wealth gap that has led to an uneven urban transformation and changed the original uses and appearances of buildings.

Only one building in Sevastopol's center stands out as unabashedly "Western" in every way. Situated on Lazarev Square nearly equidistant from the city's main theater and cinema, McDonald's, though small, looks like a McDonald's anywhere in the world, save for its Russian-language menu. The color, decor, food, and service are completely out of place in Sevastopol. A life-size Ronald McDonald stands outside and beckons to the passing crowd. Whereas Fete and Megasport send mixed messages, McDonald's leaves no doubt that it is the symbol of Westernization. The "otherness" of these new modern structures and businesses equate Europe and the West with modernity and affluence, but they also create and represent economic inequality.

However, some commercial interests in the city are embracing the past. The most well-known restaurant in the city, Traktir, is named for the 1855 Crimean War battle that attempted to remove the French from the city, and its interior is covered with paintings on nautical and military themes. All the servers, although they are women, dress as Imperial Russian sailors. Ironically, the restaurant is known for the best and most authentic Russian cuisine in the city, but its borsch is Ukrainian. This does not seem to matter to
Figure 6.2. The Fete store in 2004. Photograph by Karl D. Qualls.
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Figure 6.3. A store and apartments on Bol’shaia Morskaia in 2004. Photograph by Karl D. Qualls.

the Russian marines and sailors, tourists from Europe and North America, and civilian residents who frequent the restaurant. Visitors and city residents are transported into Sevastopol’s heroic past (although very superficially) during their meal.

Advertisers have also learned to target local consumers by associating their products with the city’s past. The meat products firm KAMO has placed billboards around the city stating that “There are Sausages. And there are KAMO Sausages” (figure 6.4). The background to this unimaginative slogan is the Monument to Scuttled Ships, the most beloved monument in the entire city. In short, such advertisers draw not only on the city’s Russian past but also on residents’ sense of local patriotism and identity. The intent is to associate KAMO with the city and create modern brand loyalty.

Ethnicity, Tourism, and the Redefinition of Space

Much of Sevastopol’s commercial and economic expansion no doubt comes from the renewed tourism in part stimulated by the return of Tatars to Crimea.
Tatars are the largest non-Slavic national minority in Crimea and are transforming the peninsula and to a lesser degree Sevastopol. During the 1990s, many Crimean Tatars repatriated themselves to Crimea after nearly fifty years of forced exile and began to assert their rights to ancestral lands. After a harsh decade of dramatic economic decline, some entrepreneurs in Sevastopol and Crimea realized that there was money to be made in tourism, and more specifically in ethnotourism.

The return of the Tatars has not left much of a mark on Sevastopol except for the appearance of women in traditional Muslim dress on the streets and the newly reconstructed minaret of the mosque. The greatest change has come in tourist packages that include Sevastopol and Bakhchisarai, the former capital of the Crimean Khanate, which in a sense stretches the perceived boundaries of the city. The city’s military heritage is still the central theme of most Sevastopol tours, but packaging it with ethnotourism has become increasingly popular. One-to five-day tour packages always include a walking trip around the central ring road and its monuments, the Crimean War panorama and museum on Historical Boulevard, and, for some, a trip to the diorama museum of World War II at Sapun Gora. This allows the vis-

Figure 6.4. An advertisement for kamo sausages. Photograph by Karl D. Qualls.
Traveling Today through Sevastopol’s Past

itor to quickly “experience” the city’s military and naval past. For those who can spend more than one day, packages usually include a discussion of the city’s Greek heritage at the Khersones Archaeological Preserve.

Many longer tours also now include side trips to Bakhchisarai and Chufut-Kale. Located about one hour outside the city center, these two sites highlight the region’s Tatar and Karaite heritage, respectively. Sandwiched between the two sites is the Russian Orthodox Uspenskii Monastery, which is built into a cave. Whereas Khersones takes tourists back 2,500 years, Bakhchisarai and Chufut-Kale illustrate the close relationship between Tatars and Karaites since the Middle Ages. The additional attention paid to Orthodox sites like the Uspenskii Monastery, the site of Vladimir the Great’s baptism at Khersones, and the various cave monasteries surrounding the city brings a new dimension to Sevastopol tourism that one could not experience in the Soviet era. Highlighting the Russian Church, Tatars, and Karaites illuminates the centrality of Crimea to all these groups and separates the peninsula demographically and religiously from Europe. The projected uniqueness of the city and region further places Sevastopol outside a Europe toward which much of the former Soviet bloc gravitates. An October 2004 survey in one of Sevastopol’s local newspapers asked people what the first priority of a new Ukrainian president should be, and “closer relations with the European Union” and “entrance into NATO” were nonissues for respondents.

Other influences appear on Sevastopol’s streets. Tourists who crave trinkets, souvenirs, and kitsch will find a curious array on Primorskii Boulevard in the city center (figure 6.5). Alongside the magnificent outdoor art market, dozens of vendors sell traditional knickknacks that represent Sevastopol: sea shells, ceramic dolphins, T-shirts, and more. However, the twenty-first-century mix includes a tremendous number of Buddha statues, pyramids, incense sticks and mystical signs, symbols, and jewelry. There are several possible explanations for what appears to be an odd turn to Eastern mysticism. Market forces may be driving the supply of these goods at the tourist markets because visitors perceive Sevastopol/Crimea as “the East.” But this begs the question as to what formed this perception. Perhaps the tour packages to Bakhchisarai and other places have started to create a “non-Western” image for the region that tourists find appealing. Vendors might also be consciously orienting themselves toward the East. The latter explanation seems more problematic because political and cultural orientations trend toward Russia, but Sevastopol also could be in the throes of yet another attempt to rediscover and promote its “Asiatic” nature, à la Sergey
A. Nakhimov Square
B. Lazarev Square
C. Ushakov Square
D. Historical Boulevard
E. Primorksi Boulevard
F. Vladimir Square
F. Petropavlovskai Square

1. Nakhimov Street
2. Bolshaia Morskaia
3. Lenin Street

Korabelnaia due east
Severnaia due north
Black Sea outlet northwest

Diaghilev’s Ballet Russe a century earlier. Though its marketplace might sometimes seem torn between Western consumerism and Eastern mysticism, the monuments to the Crimean War and World War II remain the most important loci of identity and dominate public space.

Politically and Spatially Fractured: Sevastopol’s 2004 Presidential Campaign

The 2004 presidential election campaign highlighted the juxtaposition of old and new, Russia and Europe in Sevastopol. Traditionally, Nakhimov Square, one of the oldest parts of the city, has been the site of demonstrations and parades. Sevastopol celebrated all major holidays with parades and marches around the ring road that started and ended at Nakhimov Square. It is not surprising that the Communist and Socialist parties in the 2004 presidential campaign used this area for their demonstrations with speakers, megaphones, songs, and marches. One of the communist parties held a nearly daily vigil at the entrance of Primorskii Boulevard, the city’s traditional and still most popular leisure area, into Nakhimov Square. Along the wrought iron garden fence the communists placed placards, all in Russian, decrying capitalism, nationalism, and Ukrainian participation in the occupation of Iraq. This older geographic space became the location for the older residents’ political stand.

Viktor Yushchenko’s younger and distinctly Ukrainian “Orange Revolution” was not well received in overwhelmingly Russian Sevastopol. His supporters chose a location that could not be more different from the communists’ choice. A lone Yushchenko information tent stood along the central ring road directly in front of McDonald’s. In talking to the twentiesomethings working for Yushchenko’s campaign, none knew if the location was selected for a particular reason. Situated on the ring road, there is a great deal of foot traffic in the area, both by residents and tourists. Moreover, McDonald’s, as in many countries, serves as a meeting place for the city’s youth. Because the Yushchenko campaign targeted youth in particular in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, McDonald’s seemed to be a perfect location to bring his message to the youngest voters in the city. It is likely that the symbolism of this location was intentional. Closer ties to Europe and greater economic integration and development formed the base of Yushchenko’s campaign; therefore, an information tent in front of one of the largest global corporations based in the West would link Yushchenko with economic vitality and modernization. Contact with the European Union and
NATO stood near the top of his international agenda, but the local press decried Yushchenko’s plans to prepare Ukraine for entry into the EU as the harbinger of “national catastrophe” that would create conflict with Russia, as happened in Georgia after its revolution. Questions of illegal campaign contributions and U.S. interference on his behalf were also common. When juxtaposed with the communist-defined space on Nakhimov Square and its statue to the Crimean War admiral P. S. Nakhimov, the contrast between old and new could not have been clearer.

The campaign of Yushchenko’s opponent, Viktor Yanukovich, moved unhindered throughout Sevastopol’s built space, unlike Yushchenko, who rarely ventured past Simferopol’s airport, about 100 kilometers from Sevastopol. Yanukovich’s overwhelming popularity among the largely Russophile residents allowed him and his supporters to roam freely throughout the city. His placards and information kiosks dotted the urban landscape. The most persistent location for Yanukovich’s presence was at the newspaper kiosk. In addition to large posters of a smiling Yanukovich in the kiosk windows, local newspapers consistently carried pro-Yanukovich articles and carried scathing exposes of Yushchenko and his policies. Journalists portrayed Yanukovich as the champion of the poor and downtrodden and Yushchenko (especially during his time as prime minister) as taking money from invalids and families with children. In both cases, Yanukovich was careful to play on Sevastopol’s existing identity and pledged to support it. He made appearances at war memorials to praise the city and its heroes and promised 10 million hryven from the central Ukrainian budget for a new war memorial and museum. With Yanukovich’s defeat, the fate of the new project and Kyiv’s financial support for the city are in question.

The political campaigns used the traditions and innovations inscribed in the urban fabric for their purposes. As long as the boundaries of tradition were maintained, the electoral campaign remained civil. Even though communists were a distinct minority, they played a role familiar to the city’s past in an area long used for demonstrations. Yushchenko’s nationalist, pro-Western campaign, however, violated Sevastopol’s traditional identity as a protector of Mother Russia and thus had less access to the public spaces of the city. Although this researcher saw no physical violence toward Yushchenko’s supporters in the city, verbal abuse was commonplace in public and in private. The abuse of Yushchenko’s supporters ranged from old women screaming about how a Yushchenko victory would undo all their sacrifices in World War II to the scolding of young men and women trying
to distribute campaign literature. One clever middle-aged man commented that the life-sized Ronald McDonald statue directly behind the campaign tent would be a better president than Yushchenko and also wondered if it was a statue of Yushchenko’s American wife. Had the Yushchenko campaign tried to organize at Russian military sites of memory, the local response might have been more violent. By staying in the most commercialized region of the ring road, the campaign aligned Yushchenko with economic progress, although one could clearly also read McDonald’s as a symbol of the destruction of the past. Communists remained true to the past both in the language and location of their political campaign. Yanukovich, who was portrayed as a protector or savior for the city and its residents, roamed freely throughout the city, crossing the boundaries of old and new, poor and rich, military and civilian.

Conclusion

Since at least World War II, Sevastopol’s residents and visitors have been bombarded with images propagating the city’s role in defending the Russian Motherland against European invaders. The constant repetition of these ideas in school, tourism, the media, and obligatory visits to sites of memory has reinforced a belief in the city’s “Russianness.” Despite recent changes that have introduced the Ukrainian language and history into public schools, Sevastopol’s pro-Russian orientation will likely continue as long as the Russian Fleet and its economic and military presence remain. This will also help to bolster Russian as the chief language of the city. The City Council seems hesitant to change street names en masse or to introduce new Ukrainian monuments unconnected to military themes. When Russia’s lease of Sevastopol’s ports ends, the World War II generation will have passed away and the direct connection to the last great defense of the city will have been severed. A younger generation of ethnically Russian children will have completed their education, including mandatory Ukrainian history and language. At that point, there may be an opportunity to inject a Ukrainian element into Sevastopol’s local identity and lend it a more European orientation. However, this seems implausible, because memories of the Crimean War and of World War II are allied so closely with the history of Russia and the Soviet Union. Unless another catastrophe levels the city and provides a tabula rasa for Ukrainian interventions, Sevastopol
likely will remain in large part a Russian city, even if only in its residents’
historical imagination. And as long as the Russian Federation continues to
see itself as separate from Europe, Sevastopol will likely do the same.

Unlike the streets of Tirana, Albania, where in 1991 residents tore down
street signs and the government has not yet agreed on new names,45 Seva-
astopol has seen little change in its toponyms since the end of the Soviet
Union. Because Sevastopol after World War II returned to its pre-Soviet
past as a vital outpost of the Russian Empire, there has been little need to
radically construct a new identity as is common in many former Soviet bloc
cities. No monuments have been torn down, street names remain the same,
some Russian Orthodox churches have been reconsecrated, and, most im-
portant, the Russian Fleet remains at home in this Ukrainian port city. The
fleet keeps Sevastopol’s demographic composition overwhelmingly Rus-
sian and makes Ukrainianization and Europeanization more difficult.46

Notes

1. The Heroic Defence of Sevastopol (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing
House, 1942); Sevastopol: November, 1941–July, 1942: Articles, Stories and Eye-Witness
Accounts by Soviet War Correspondents (London: Hutchinson, 1943); Karl Qualls,
“Imagining Sevastopol: History and Postwar Community Construction, 1942–1953,”

2. Travel guidebooks were one of the chief sources for official narratives. See, e.g.,
Zakhar Chebaniuk, Sevastopol: istoricheskie mesta i pamiatniki (Simferopol: Krymiz-
dat, 1957); Emiliiia Doronina and T. I. Iakovleva, Pamiatniki Sevastopolia: spravochnik
(Simferopol: Tavria, 1987); and Boris Rossekin and Georgii Semin, Sevastopol: putevoditel-spravochnik
(Simferopol: Krymizdat, 1961).

3. E.g., see “9 maja: Den’ Pobedy!” Slava Sevastopolia, May 8, 2003; “Znatoki istorii,”
Slava Sevastopolia, September 9, 2004; Elizaveta Iurzditskaiia, “150 let: Voina i
mir, Sevastopol’skaia strada,” Slava Sevastopolia, September 9, 2004; and Vladimir

4. On local initiatives in planning, see Karl D. Qualls, “Local-Outsider Negotia-
tions in Sevastopol’s Postwar Reconstruction, 1944–53,” in Provincial Landscapes: The
Local Dimensions of Soviet Power, ed. Donald J. Raleigh (Pittsburgh: University of Pitts-

5. For an overview of Soviet name changes, see John Murray, Politics and Place-
Names: Changing Names in the Late Soviet Period (Birmingham: Birmingham Slavonic
Monographs, 2000).

6. For more on the role of the Navy, see Qualls, “Imagining Sevastopol.”

7. Crimean Karaites (Karaim) differ from the other Karaite Jews because the for-
mer developed from a Turkic language community rather than Hebrew, Aramaic, or Ara-
bic. This further separates Crimean Karaites from other Jews in general and other
Karaites in particular. This chapter uses “Karaite” to refer to the Crimean community.


11. The Soviet Union denied the 1948 earthquake until the 1990s. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, it was a magnitude 7.3 with over 100,000 killed, which makes it one of the deadliest on record. See http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/eqlists/eqsmosde.html. The Directorate for the Reconstruction of Sevastopol discussed the issue in 1949. See Russian State Archive of the Economy (hereafter RGAE), f. 9432, op. 1, d. 387, ll. 330–35.

12. In 1948 the Council of Ministers ordered that Sevastopol be completed in “3–4 years.” To facilitate this, it raised Sevastopol to a “city of republic subordination,” which meant, among other things, that its budget and orders came directly from the Russian Federation, not the Crimean Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republic. See GAGS, f. R-79, op. 2, d. 103, l. 221.


18. The author personally witnessed two Russian sailors bloodying a Ukrainian sailor in 1997. Russian hegemony was also apparent during the military parade celebrating the city’s liberation from Nazi Germany, when most onlookers left the sidewalks after the Russian forces marched by, leaving near empty streets for the Ukrainian fleet.


22. Carol J. Williams, “Ribbon Cut on a New Crimean War: An Apartment House,
Built by Moscow’s Mayor, Opens in Sevastopol; and as Russians Move in, So Enters a New Jab at Black Sea Fleet Deal,” *Los Angeles Times*, October 5, 1997.


26. Interviews in Sevastopol with Lika Drozdova, October 17, 2004; Iurii Fefer, October 23, 2004; and Vladimir Semenov, October 23, 2004. Their sentiments were echoed in the author’s casual conversations with commuters at the bus stop in front of the monument.


28. In 1952, Sevastopol’s Executive Committee and the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet agreed to petition the Russian Federation to restore the cathedral as a “historical memorial” to the four admirals rather than pulling it down and constructing a mausoleum. See GAGS, f. R-79, op. 2, d. 340, l. 286.

29. In addition to the Sevastopol encyclopedia entries for these sites, see Venikeev, *Arkhitetkura Sevastapolia*; and E. V. Venikeev, *Sevastopol i ego okrestnosti* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1986). *Putevodiitel’: Sevastopol’* (Simferopol: Svit, 2004), 5, suggests that the reopening of the cathedral is central to the city’s plan to remake its image by 2010 into a tourist center.


37. For a sampling of sites (whose content was available as of December 2004), see http://www.tourism.crimea.ua (the official site of the Ministry of Resorts and Tourism of Crimea); http://sevtour.by.ru; http://www.dreamland.crimea.ua/; and http://rest.crimea.ua/; http://www.tour-ethno.com.

39. Many specialists reviewing the initial reconstruction plans after World War II noted that all redesigning of the square had to account for its central function as an agitational space. See RGAE, f. 9432, l. d. 243, l. 13.


46. As of 2001, 74 percent of Sevastopol’s population was Russian, 21 percent was Ukrainian, and 5 percent was Belarusians, Crimean Tatars, Jews, Armenians, Greeks, Germans, Moldovans, Poles, and more. Aleksandr Dobry and Irina Borisova, Welcome to Sevastopol (Simferopol: Tavriia, 2001), 5.